contains 148 rules |
System SettingsgroupContains rules that check correct system settings. |
contains 116 rules |
Installing and Maintaining SoftwaregroupThe following sections contain information on
security-relevant choices during the initial operating system
installation process and the setup of software
updates. |
contains 13 rules |
Disk PartitioninggroupTo ensure separation and protection of data, there
are top-level system directories which should be placed on their
own physical partition or logical volume. The installer's default
partitioning scheme creates separate logical volumes for
/ , /boot , and swap .
- If starting with any of the default layouts, check the box to
"Review and modify partitioning." This allows for the easy creation
of additional logical volumes inside the volume group already
created, though it may require making
/ 's logical volume smaller to
create space. In general, using logical volumes is preferable to
using partitions because they can be more easily adjusted
later. - If creating a custom layout, create the partitions mentioned in
the previous paragraph (which the installer will require anyway),
as well as separate ones described in the following sections.
If a system has already been installed, and the default
partitioning scheme was used, it is possible but nontrivial to
modify it to create separate logical volumes for the directories
listed above. The Logical Volume Manager (LVM) makes this possible.
See the LVM HOWTO at http://tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/ for more
detailed information on LVM. |
contains 1 rule |
Encrypt Partitionsrule
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 natively supports partition encryption through the
Linux Unified Key Setup-on-disk-format (LUKS) technology. The easiest way to
encrypt a partition is during installation time.
For manual installations, select the Encrypt checkbox during
partition creation to encrypt the partition. When this
option is selected the system will prompt for a passphrase to use in
decrypting the partition. The passphrase will subsequently need to be entered manually
every time the system boots.
For automated/unattended installations, it is possible to use Kickstart by adding
the --encrypted and --passphrase= options to the definition of each partition to be
encrypted. For example, the following line would encrypt the root partition:
part / --fstype=ext4 --size=100 --onpart=hda1 --encrypted --passphrase=PASSPHRASE
Any PASSPHRASE is stored in the Kickstart in plaintext, and the Kickstart must then be protected accordingly.
Omitting the --passphrase= option from the partition definition will cause the
installer to pause and interactively ask for the passphrase during installation.
Detailed information on encrypting partitions using LUKS can be found on
the Red Hat Documentation web site:
https://docs.redhat.com/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/Security_Guide/sec-Encryption.html
Rationale:
The risk of a system's physical compromise, particularly mobile systems such as
laptops, places its data at risk of compromise. Encrypting this data mitigates
the risk of its loss if the system is lost.
|
Updating SoftwaregroupThe yum command line tool is used to install and
update software packages. The system also provides a graphical
software update tool in the System menu, in the Administration submenu,
called Software Update.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems contain an installed software catalog called
the RPM database, which records metadata of installed packages. Consistently using
yum or the graphical Software Update for all software installation
allows for insight into the current inventory of installed software on the system.
|
contains 4 rules |
Ensure Red Hat GPG Key Installedrule
To ensure the system can cryptographically verify base software
packages come from Red Hat (and to connect to the Red Hat Network to
receive them), the Red Hat GPG key must properly be installed.
To install the Red Hat GPG key, run:
$ sudo rhn_register
If the system is not connected to the Internet or an RHN Satellite,
then install the Red Hat GPG key from trusted media such as
the Red Hat installation CD-ROM or DVD. Assuming the disc is mounted
in /media/cdrom , use the following command as the root user to import
it into the keyring:
$ sudo rpm --import /media/cdrom/RPM-GPG-KEY
Rationale:
Changes to software components can have significant effects on the
overall security of the operating system. This requirement ensures
the software has not been tampered with and that it has been provided
by a trusted vendor. The Red Hat GPG key is necessary to
cryptographically verify packages are from Red Hat.
Remediation script:# The two fingerprints below are retrieved from https://access.redhat.com/security/team/key
readonly REDHAT_RELEASE_2_FINGERPRINT="567E 347A D004 4ADE 55BA 8A5F 199E 2F91 FD43 1D51"
readonly REDHAT_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT="43A6 E49C 4A38 F4BE 9ABF 2A53 4568 9C88 2FA6 58E0"
# Location of the key we would like to import (once it's integrity verified)
readonly REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY="/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release"
RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS=$(stat -c %a "$(dirname "$REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY")")
# Verify /etc/pki/rpm-gpg directory permissions are safe
if [ "${RPM_GPG_DIR_PERMS}" -le "755" ]
then
# If they are safe, try to obtain fingerprints from the key file
# (to ensure there won't be e.g. CRC error)
IFS=$'\n' GPG_OUT=($(gpg --with-fingerprint "${REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY}"))
GPG_RESULT=$?
# No CRC error, safe to proceed
if [ "${GPG_RESULT}" -eq "0" ]
then
for ITEM in "${GPG_OUT[@]}"
do
# Filter just hexadecimal fingerprints from gpg's output from
# processing of a key file
RESULT=$(echo ${ITEM} | sed -n "s/[[:space:]]*Key fingerprint = \(.*\)/\1/p" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# If fingerprint matches Red Hat's release 2 or auxiliary key import the key
if [[ ${RESULT} ]] && ([[ ${RESULT} = "${REDHAT_RELEASE_2_FINGERPRINT}" ]] || \
[[ ${RESULT} = "${REDHAT_AUXILIARY_FINGERPRINT}" ]])
then
rpm --import "${REDHAT_RELEASE_KEY}"
fi
done
fi
fi
|
Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main Yum ConfigurationruleThe gpgcheck option controls whether
RPM packages' signatures are always checked prior to installation.
To configure yum to check package signatures before installing
them, ensure the following line appears in /etc/yum.conf in
the [main] section:
gpgcheck=1
Rationale:
Changes to any software components can have significant effects on the overall security
of the operating system. This requirement ensures the software has not been tampered with
and that it has been provided by a trusted vendor.
Accordingly, patches, service packs, device drivers, or operating system components must
be signed with a certificate recognized and approved by the organization.
Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation
validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from
a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and
that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed
certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates
used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate
Authority (CA).
Remediation script:sed -i 's/gpgcheck=.*/gpgcheck=1/g' /etc/yum.conf
|
Ensure gpgcheck Enabled For All Yum Package RepositoriesruleTo ensure signature checking is not disabled for
any repos, remove any lines from files in /etc/yum.repos.d of the form:
gpgcheck=0
Rationale:
Verifying the authenticity of the software prior to installation
validates the integrity of the patch or upgrade received from
a vendor. This ensures the software has not been tampered with and
that it has been provided by a trusted vendor. Self-signed
certificates are disallowed by this requirement. Certificates
used to verify the software must be from an approved Certificate
Authority (CA).
Remediation script:sed -i 's/gpgcheck=.*/gpgcheck=1/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/*
|
Ensure Software Patches InstalledruleIf the system is joined to the Red Hat Network, a Red Hat Satellite Server,
or a yum server, run the following command to install updates:
$ sudo yum update
If the system is not configured to use one of these sources, updates (in the form of RPM packages)
can be manually downloaded from the Red Hat Network and installed using rpm .
Rationale:
Installing software updates is a fundamental mitigation against
the exploitation of publicly-known vulnerabilities.
Remediation script:yum -y update
|
Software Integrity Checkinggroup
Both the AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment)
software and the RPM package management system provide
mechanisms for verifying the integrity of installed software.
AIDE uses snapshots of file metadata (such as hashes) and compares these
to current system files in order to detect changes.
The RPM package management system can conduct integrity
checks by comparing information in its metadata database with
files installed on the system.
Integrity checking cannot prevent intrusions,
but can detect that they have occurred. Requirements
for software integrity checking may be highly dependent on
the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based
approaches such as AIDE may induce considerable overhead
in the presence of frequent software updates.
|
contains 8 rules |
Verify Integrity with AIDEgroupAIDE conducts integrity checks by comparing information about
files with previously-gathered information. Ideally, the AIDE database is
created immediately after initial system configuration, and then again after any
software update. AIDE is highly configurable, with further configuration
information located in /usr/share/doc/aide-VERSION .
|
contains 3 rules |
Install AIDErule
Install the AIDE package with the command:
$ sudo yum install aide
Rationale:
The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command install aide
|
Build and Test AIDE DatabaseruleRun the following command to generate a new database:
$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --init
By default, the database will be written to the file /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz .
Storing the database, the configuration file /etc/aide.conf , and the binary
/usr/sbin/aide (or hashes of these files), in a secure location (such as on read-only media) provides additional assurance about their integrity.
The newly-generated database can be installed as follows:
$ sudo cp /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz
To initiate a manual check, run the following command:
$ sudo /usr/sbin/aide --check
If this check produces any unexpected output, investigate.
Rationale:
For AIDE to be effective, an initial database of "known-good" information about files
must be captured and it should be able to be verified against the installed files.
Remediation script:/usr/sbin/aide --init
|
Configure Periodic Execution of AIDErule
To implement a daily execution of AIDE at 4:05am using cron, add the following line to /etc/crontab :
05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check
AIDE can be executed periodically through other means; this is merely one example.
Rationale:
By default, AIDE does not install itself for periodic execution. Periodically
running AIDE is necessary to reveal unexpected changes in installed files.
identifiers:
references:
CM-3(d), CM-3(e), CM-6(d), CM-6(3), SC-28, SI-7, 374, 416, 1069, 1263, 1297, 1589, Req-11.5, 1.3.1 Remediation script:echo "05 4 * * * root /usr/sbin/aide --check" >> /etc/crontab
|
Verify Integrity with RPMgroupThe RPM package management system includes the ability
to verify the integrity of installed packages by comparing the
installed files with information about the files taken from the
package metadata stored in the RPM database. Although an attacker
could corrupt the RPM database (analogous to attacking the AIDE
database as described above), this check can still reveal
modification of important files. To list which files on the system differ from what is expected by the RPM database:
$ rpm -qVa
See the man page for rpm to see a complete explanation of each column.
|
contains 2 rules |
Verify and Correct File Permissions with RPMrule
Discretionary access control is weakened if a user or group has access
permissions to system files and directories greater than the default.
The RPM package management system can check file access permissions
of installed software packages, including many that are important
to system security.
Verify that the file permissions, ownership, and gruop membership of system files
and commands match vendor values. Check the file permissions, ownership, and group
membership with the following command:
$ sudo rpm -Va | grep '^.M'
Output indicates files that do not match vendor defaults. After locating a file with incorrect permissions, run the following command to determine which package owns it:
$ rpm -qf FILENAME
Next, run the following command to reset its permissions to
the correct values:
$ sudo rpm --setperms PACKAGENAME
warning
Note: Due to a bug in the gdm package, the
RPM verify command may continue to fail even after file permissions have been
correctly set on /var/log/gdm . This is being tracked in Red Hat
Bugzilla #1275532.
Rationale:
Permissions on system binaries and configuration files that are too generous
could allow an unauthorized user to gain privileges that they should not have.
The permissions set by the vendor should be maintained. Any deviations from
this baseline should be investigated.
identifiers:
references:
AC-6, CM-6(d), CM-6(3), 1493, 1494, 1495, Req-11.5, 1.2.6, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.1.5, 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 6.1.8, 6.1.9, 6.2.3, RHEL-07-010010 Remediation script:
# Declare array to hold list of RPM packages we need to correct permissions for
declare -a SETPERMS_RPM_LIST
# Create a list of files on the system having permissions different from what
# is expected by the RPM database
FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS=($(rpm -Va --nofiledigest | grep '^.M'))
# For each file path from that list:
# * Determine the RPM package the file path is shipped by,
# * Include it into SETPERMS_RPM_LIST array
for FILE_PATH in "${FILES_WITH_INCORRECT_PERMS[@]}"
do
RPM_PACKAGE=$(rpm -qf "$FILE_PATH")
SETPERMS_RPM_LIST=("${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}" "$RPM_PACKAGE")
done
# Remove duplicate mention of same RPM in $SETPERMS_RPM_LIST (if any)
SETPERMS_RPM_LIST=( $(echo "${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}" | sort -n | uniq) )
# For each of the RPM packages left in the list -- reset its permissions to the
# correct values
for RPM_PACKAGE in "${SETPERMS_RPM_LIST[@]}"
do
rpm --setperms "${RPM_PACKAGE}"
done
|
Verify File Hashes with RPMruleWithout cryptographic integrity protections, system
executables and files can be altered by unauthorized users without
detection.
The RPM package management system can check the hashes of
installed software packages, including many that are important to system
security.
To verify that the cryptographic hash of system files and commands match vendor
values, run the following command to list which files on the system
have hashes that differ from what is expected by the RPM database:
$ rpm -Va | grep '^..5'
A "c" in the second column indicates that a file is a configuration file, which
may appropriately be expected to change. If the file was not expected to
change, investigate the cause of the change using audit logs or other means.
The package can then be reinstalled to restore the file.
Run the following command to determine which package owns the file:
$ rpm -qf FILENAME
The package can be reinstalled from a yum repository using the command:
$ sudo yum reinstall PACKAGENAME
Alternatively, the package can be reinstalled from trusted media using the command:
$ sudo rpm -Uvh PACKAGENAME
Rationale:
The hashes of important files like system executables should match the
information given by the RPM database. Executables with erroneous hashes could
be a sign of nefarious activity on the system. |
Additional Security Softwaregroup
Additional security software that is not provided or supported
by Red Hat can be installed to provide complementary or duplicative
security capabilities to those provided by the base platform. Add-on
software may not be appropriate for some specialized systems.
|
contains 2 rules |
Install Intrusion Detection Softwarerule
The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that
can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based
intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user
sessions which may become compromised.
warning
Note in DoD environments, supplemental intrusion
detection tools, such as the McAfee Host-based Security System, are available
to integrate with existing infrastructure. When these supplemental tools
interfere with proper functioning of SELinux, SELinux takes precedence. Rationale:
Host-based intrusion detection tools provide a system-level defense when an
intruder gains access to a system or network.
|
Install Virus Scanning Softwarerule
Install virus scanning software, which uses signatures to search for the
presence of viruses on the filesystem.
Ensure virus definition files are no older than 7 days, or their last release.
Configure the virus scanning software to perform scans dynamically on all
accessed files. If this is not possible, configure the
system to scan all altered files on the system on a daily
basis. If the system processes inbound SMTP mail, configure the virus scanner
to scan all received mail.
Rationale:
Virus scanning software can be used to detect if a system has been compromised by
computer viruses, as well as to limit their spread to other systems.
|
Disable Prelinkingrule
The prelinking feature changes binaries in an attempt to decrease their startup
time. In order to disable it, change or add the following line inside the file
/etc/sysconfig/prelink :
PRELINKING=no
Next, run the following command to return binaries to a normal, non-prelinked state:
$ sudo /usr/sbin/prelink -ua
Rationale:
Because the prelinking feature changes binaries, it can interfere with the
operation of certain software and/or modes such as AIDE, FIPS, etc.
Remediation script:#
# Disable prelinking altogether
#
if grep -q ^PRELINKING /etc/sysconfig/prelink
then
sed -i 's/PRELINKING.*/PRELINKING=no/g' /etc/sysconfig/prelink
else
echo -e "\n# Set PRELINKING=no per security requirements" >> /etc/sysconfig/prelink
echo "PRELINKING=no" >> /etc/sysconfig/prelink
fi
#
# Undo previous prelink changes to binaries
#
/usr/sbin/prelink -ua
|
File Permissions and MasksgroupTraditional Unix security relies heavily on file and
directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or
modifying files to which they should not have access.
Several of the commands in this section search filesystems
for files or directories with certain characteristics, and are
intended to be run on every local partition on a given system.
When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below,
it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the
name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn.
The following command prints a list of all xfs partitions on the local
system, which is the default filesystem for Red Hat Enterprise Linux
7 installations:
$ mount -t xfs | awk '{print $3}'
For any systems that use a different
local filesystem type, modify this command as appropriate.
|
contains 14 rules |
Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of
FilesystemsgroupLinux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition
and removal of filesystems on a running system. These facilities may be
necessary in many environments, but this capability also carries some risk -- whether direct
risk from allowing users to introduce arbitrary filesystems,
or risk that software flaws in the automated mount facility itself could
allow an attacker to compromise the system.
This command can be used to list the types of filesystems that are
available to the currently executing kernel:
$ find /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/fs -type f -name '*.ko'
If these filesystems are not required then they can be explicitly disabled
in a configuratio file in /etc/modprobe.d .
|
contains 5 rules |
Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driverrule
To prevent USB storage devices from being used, configure the kernel module loading system
to prevent automatic loading of the USB storage driver.
To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage
kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/modprobe.d :
install usb-storage /bin/true
This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage
module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the
insmod program to load the module manually.Rationale:USB storage devices such as thumb drives can be used to introduce
malicious software. identifiers:
references:
AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), IA-3, 366, 778, 1958, SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-0016, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-020160 Remediation script:echo "install usb-storage /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
|
Disable Kernel Support for USB via Bootloader Configurationrule
All USB support can be disabled by adding the nousb
argument to the kernel's boot loader configuration. To do so,
append "nousb" to the kernel line in /etc/default/grub as shown:
kernel /vmlinuz-VERSION ro vga=ext root=/dev/VolGroup00/LogVol00 rhgb quiet nousb
WARNING: Disabling all kernel support for USB will cause problems for
systems with USB-based keyboards, mice, or printers. This configuration is
infeasible for systems which require USB devices, which is common.Rationale:Disabling the USB subsystem within the Linux kernel at system boot will
protect against potentially malicious USB devices, although it is only practical
in specialized systems.
Remediation script:
# Correct the form of default kernel command line in /etc/default/grub
if ! grep -q ^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\".*nousb.*\" /etc/default/grub;
then
# Edit configuration setting
# Append 'nousb' argument to /etc/default/grub (if not present yet)
sed -i "s/\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\)\"\(.*\)\"/\1\"\2 nousb\"/" /etc/default/grub
# Edit runtime setting
# Correct the form of kernel command line for each installed kernel in the bootloader
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="nousb"
fi
|
Disable Booting from USB Devices in Boot FirmwareruleConfigure the system boot firmware (historically called BIOS on PC
systems) to disallow booting from USB drives.
Rationale:Booting a system from a USB device would allow an attacker to
circumvent any security measures provided by the operating system. Attackers
could mount partitions and modify the configuration of the OS. |
Assign Password to Prevent Changes to Boot Firmware ConfigurationruleAssign a password to the system boot firmware (historically called BIOS on PC
systems) to require a password for any configuration changes.
Rationale:Assigning a password to the system boot firmware prevents anyone
with physical access from configuring the system to boot
from local media and circumvent the operating system's access controls.
For systems in physically secure locations, such as
a data center or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), this risk must be weighed
against the risk of administrative personnel being unable to conduct recovery operations in
a timely fashion.
|
Disable the AutomounterruleThe autofs daemon mounts and unmounts filesystems, such as user
home directories shared via NFS, on demand. In addition, autofs can be used to handle
removable media, and the default configuration provides the cdrom device as /misc/cd .
However, this method of providing access to removable media is not common, so autofs
can almost always be disabled if NFS is not in use. Even if NFS is required, it may be
possible to configure filesystem mounts statically by editing /etc/fstab
rather than relying on the automounter.
The autofs service can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable autofs.service
Rationale:Disabling the automounter permits the administrator to
statically control filesystem mounting through /etc/fstab .
identifiers:
references:
AC-19(a), AC-19(d), AC-19(e), IA-3, 366, 778, 1958, SRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-020160 Remediation script:#
# Disable autofs.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable autofs.service
#
# Stop autofs.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop autofs.service
|
Verify Permissions on Important Files and
DirectoriesgroupPermissions for many files on a system must be set
restrictively to ensure sensitive information is properly protected.
This section discusses important
permission restrictions which can be verified
to ensure that no harmful discrepancies have
arisen. |
contains 2 rules |
Ensure All Files Are Owned by a UserruleIf any files are not owned by a user, then the
cause of their lack of ownership should be investigated.
Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an
appropriate user.
Rationale:
Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally
a sign that something is amiss. They may
be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or
draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging
to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they
will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future,
and the cause should be discovered and addressed.
|
Ensure All Files Are Owned by a GroupruleIf any files are not owned by a group, then the
cause of their lack of group-ownership should be investigated.
Following this, the files should be deleted or assigned to an
appropriate group.
Rationale:
Unowned files do not directly imply a security problem, but they are generally
a sign that something is amiss. They may
be caused by an intruder, by incorrect software installation or
draft software removal, or by failure to remove all files belonging
to a deleted account. The files should be repaired so they
will not cause problems when accounts are created in the future,
and the cause should be discovered and addressed.
|
Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution PatternsgroupThe recommendations in this section are designed to
ensure that the system's features to protect against potentially
dangerous program execution are activated.
These protections are applied at the system initialization or
kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-configured
or compromised programs. |
contains 7 rules |
Daemon UmaskgroupThe umask is a per-process setting which limits
the default permissions for creation of new files and directories.
The system includes initialization scripts which set the default umask
for system daemons.
|
contains 1 rule |
Set Daemon UmaskruleThe file /etc/init.d/functions includes initialization
parameters for most or all daemons started at boot time. The default umask of
022 prevents creation of group- or world-writable files. To set the default
umask for daemons, edit the following line, inserting 022 or 027 for
UMASK appropriately:
umask 022
Setting the umask to too restrictive a setting can cause serious errors at
runtime. Many daemons on the system already individually restrict themselves to
a umask of 077 in their own init scripts.
Rationale:The umask influences the permissions assigned to files created by a
process at run time. An unnecessarily permissive umask could result in files
being created with insecure permissions. Remediation script:
var_umask_for_daemons="022"
grep -q ^umask /etc/init.d/functions && \
sed -i "s/umask.*/umask $var_umask_for_daemons/g" /etc/init.d/functions
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "umask $var_umask_for_daemons" >> /etc/init.d/functions
fi
|
Disable Core DumpsgroupA core dump file is the memory image of an executable
program when it was terminated by the operating system due to
errant behavior. In most cases, only software developers
legitimately need to access these files. The core dump files may
also contain sensitive information, or unnecessarily occupy large
amounts of disk space.
Once a hard limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf , a
user cannot increase that limit within his or her own session. If access
to core dumps is required, consider restricting them to only
certain users or groups. See the limits.conf man page for more
information.
The core dumps of setuid programs are further protected. The
sysctl variable fs.suid_dumpable controls whether
the kernel allows core dumps from these programs at all. The default
value of 0 is recommended. |
contains 1 rule |
Disable Core Dumps for SUID programsrule
To set the runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w fs.suid_dumpable=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
fs.suid_dumpable = 0
Rationale:The core dump of a setuid program is more likely to contain
sensitive data, as the program itself runs with greater privileges than the
user who initiated execution of the program. Disabling the ability for any
setuid program to write a core file decreases the risk of unauthorized access
of such data. Remediation script:#
# Set runtime for fs.suid_dumpable
#
sysctl -q -n -w fs.suid_dumpable=0
#
# If fs.suid_dumpable present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
# else, add "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^fs.suid_dumpable /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i 's/^fs.suid_dumpable.*/fs.suid_dumpable = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set fs.suid_dumpable to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Enable ExecShieldgroupExecShield describes kernel features that provide
protection against exploitation of memory corruption errors such as buffer
overflows. These features include random placement of the stack and other
memory regions, prevention of execution in memory that should only hold data,
and special handling of text buffers. These protections are enabled by default
on 32-bit systems and controlled through sysctl variables
kernel.exec-shield and kernel.randomize_va_space . On the latest
64-bit systems, kernel.exec-shield cannot be enabled or disabled with
sysctl .
|
contains 2 rules |
Enable ExecShieldruleBy default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 64-bit systems, ExecShield
is enabled and can only be disabled if the hardware does not support ExecShield
or is disabled in /etc/default/grub . For Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
32-bit systems, sysctl can be used to enable ExecShield. Rationale:ExecShield uses the segmentation feature on all x86 systems
to prevent execution in memory higher than a certain address. It
writes an address as a limit in the code segment descriptor, to
control where code can be executed, on a per-process basis. When
the kernel places a process's memory regions such as the stack and
heap higher than this address, the hardware prevents execution in that
address range. This is enabled by default on the latest Red Hat and Fedora
systems if supported by the hardware. Remediation script:if [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] ; then
#
# Set runtime for kernel.exec-shield
#
sysctl -q -n -w kernel.exec-shield=1
#
# If kernel.exec-shield present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1"
# else, add "kernel.exec-shield = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^kernel.exec-shield /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i 's/^kernel.exec-shield.*/kernel.exec-shield = 1/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set kernel.exec-shield to 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "kernel.exec-shield = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/sysctl.conf
fi
fi
if [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "64" ] ; then
if grep --silent noexec /boot/grub2/grub*.cfg ; then
sed -i "s/noexec.*//g" /etc/default/grub
sed -i "s/noexec.*//g" /etc/grub.d/*
GRUBCFG=`ls | grep '.cfg$'`
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/$GRUBCFG
fi
fi
|
Enable Randomized Layout of Virtual Address Spacerule
To set the runtime status of the kernel.randomize_va_space kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=2
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
Rationale: Address space layout randomization (ASLR) makes it more difficult
for an attacker to predict the location of attack code they have introduced
into a process's address space during an attempt at exploitation. Additionally, ASLR
makes it more difficult for an attacker to know the location of existing code
in order to re-purpose it using return oriented programming (ROP) techniques.
Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/sysctl.conf' '^kernel.randomize_va_space' '2' 'CCENUM'
|
Enable Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) Support on
x86 SystemsgroupRecent processors in the x86 family support the
ability to prevent code execution on a per memory page basis.
Generically and on AMD processors, this ability is called No
Execute (NX), while on Intel processors it is called Execute
Disable (XD). This ability can help prevent exploitation of buffer
overflow vulnerabilities and should be activated whenever possible.
Extra steps must be taken to ensure that this protection is
enabled, particularly on 32-bit x86 systems. Other processors, such
as Itanium and POWER, have included such support since inception
and the standard kernel for those platforms supports the
feature. This is enabled by default on the latest Red Hat and
Fedora systems if supported by the hardware. |
contains 2 rules |
Install PAE Kernel on Supported 32-bit x86 SystemsruleSystems that are using the 64-bit x86 kernel package
do not need to install the kernel-PAE package because the 64-bit
x86 kernel already includes this support. However, if the system is
32-bit and also supports the PAE and NX features as
determined in the previous section, the kernel-PAE package should
be installed to enable XD or NX support:
$ sudo yum install kernel-PAE
The installation process should also have configured the
bootloader to load the new kernel at boot. Verify this at reboot
and modify /etc/default/grub if necessary.warning
The kernel-PAE package should not be
installed on older systems that do not support the XD or NX bit, as
this may prevent them from booting. Rationale:On 32-bit systems that support the XD or NX bit, the vendor-supplied
PAE kernel is required to enable either Execute Disable (XD) or No Execute (NX) support. |
Enable NX or XD Support in the BIOSruleReboot the system and enter the BIOS or Setup configuration menu.
Navigate the BIOS configuration menu and make sure that the option is enabled. The setting may be located
under a Security section. Look for Execute Disable (XD) on Intel-based systems and No Execute (NX)
on AMD-based systems. Rationale:Computers with the ability to prevent this type of code execution frequently put an option in the BIOS that will
allow users to turn the feature on or off at will. |
Restrict Access to Kernel Message Bufferrule
To set the runtime status of the kernel.dmesg_restrict kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.dmesg_restrict=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
Rationale:Unprivileged access to the kernel syslog can expose sensitive kernel
address information. Remediation script:#
# Set runtime for kernel.dmesg_restrict
#
sysctl -q -n -w kernel.dmesg_restrict=1
#
# If kernel.dmesg_restrict present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "1"
# else, add "kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^kernel.dmesg_restrict /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i 's/^kernel.dmesg_restrict.*/kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set kernel.dmesg_restrict to 1 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
SELinuxgroupSELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be
used to guard against misconfigured or compromised programs.
SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what
files they can access and what actions they can take.
The default SELinux policy, as configured on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, has been
sufficiently developed and debugged that it should be usable on
almost any Red Hat machine with minimal configuration and a small
amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents
system services - including most of the common network-visible
services such as mail servers, FTP servers, and DNS servers - from
accessing files which those services have no valid reason to
access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage
from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and
so forth.
This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the
default (targeted) policy on every Red Hat system, unless that
system has unusual requirements which make a stronger policy
appropriate.
|
contains 5 rules |
Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grubruleSELinux can be disabled at boot time by an argument in
/etc/default/grub .
Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that
file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot.
Rationale:
Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents
it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases
the chances that it will remain off during system operation.
Remediation script:sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/selinux=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/enforcing=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*
|
Ensure SELinux State is EnforcingruleThe SELinux state should be set to enforcing at
system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config , add or correct the
following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing mode:
SELINUX=enforcing
Rationale:
Setting the SELinux state to enforcing ensures SELinux is able to confine
potentially compromised processes to the security policy, which is designed to
prevent them from causing damage to the system or further elevating their
privileges.
Remediation script:
var_selinux_state="enforcing"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/sysconfig/selinux' '^SELINUX=' $var_selinux_state 'CCENUM' '%s=%s'
|
Configure SELinux PolicyruleThe SELinux targeted policy is appropriate for
general-purpose desktops and servers, as well as systems in many other roles.
To configure the system to use this policy, add or correct the following line
in /etc/selinux/config :
SELINUXTYPE=targeted
Other policies, such as mls , provide additional security labeling
and greater confinement but are not compatible with many general-purpose
use cases.
Rationale:
Setting the SELinux policy to targeted or a more specialized policy
ensures the system will confine processes that are likely to be
targeted for exploitation, such as network or system services.
Note: During the development or debugging of SELinux modules, it is common to
temporarily place non-production systems in permissive mode. In such
temporary cases, SELinux policies should be developed, and once work
is completed, the system should be reconfigured to
targeted .
Remediation script:
var_selinux_policy_name="targeted"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/sysconfig/selinux' '^SELINUXTYPE=' $var_selinux_policy_name 'CCENUM' '%s=%s'
|
Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinuxrule
Daemons for which the SELinux policy does not contain rules will inherit the
context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during
startup and descend from the init process, they inherit the initrc_t context.
To check for unconfined daemons, run the following command:
$ sudo ps -eZ | egrep "initrc" | egrep -vw "tr|ps|egrep|bash|awk" | tr ':' ' ' | awk '{ print $NF }'
It should produce no output in a well-configured system.
Rationale:
Daemons which run with the initrc_t context may cause AVC denials,
or allow privileges that the daemon does not require.
|
Ensure No Device Files are Unlabeled by SELinuxruleDevice files, which are used for communication with important
system resources, should be labeled with proper SELinux types. If any device
files carry the SELinux type device_t , report the bug so that policy can be corrected. Supply information about what the device is and what programs use it.
Rationale:
If a device file carries the SELinux type device_t , then SELinux
cannot properly restrict access to the device file.
|
Account and Access ControlgroupIn traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains
shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action
or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore,
making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell
access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a
necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces
mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. |
contains 29 rules |
Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based LogingroupConventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by
providing a username and password to a login program, which tests
these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and
/etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to
guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle
attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure
console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering
usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are
operationally necessary. |
contains 9 rules |
Restrict Root Loginsgroup
Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use.
In normal situations, the administrator should access the system
via a unique unprivileged account, and then use su or sudo to execute
privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the
root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with
multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which
root can connect directly also reduces opportunities for
password-guessing against the root account. The login program
uses the file /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces
should allow root logins.
The virtual devices /dev/console
and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via
the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default
installation). The default securetty file also contains /dev/vc/* .
These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained
for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting
via network protocols. Other sections of this document
include guidance describing how to prevent root from logging in via SSH.
|
contains 4 rules |
Direct root Logins Not AllowedruleTo further limit access to the root account, administrators
can disable root logins at the console by editing the /etc/securetty file.
This file lists all devices the root user is allowed to login to. If the file does
not exist at all, the root user can login through any communication device on the
system, whether via the console or via a raw network interface. This is dangerous
as user can login to his machine as root via Telnet, which sends the password in
plain text over the network. By default, Red Hat Enteprise Linux's
/etc/securetty file only allows the root user to login at the console
physically attached to the machine. To prevent root from logging in, remove the
contents of this file. To prevent direct root logins, remove the contents of this
file by typing the following command:
$ sudo echo > /etc/securetty
Rationale:
Disabling direct root logins ensures proper accountability and multifactor
authentication to privileged accounts. Users will first login, then escalate
to privileged (root) access via su / sudo. This is required for FISMA Low
and FISMA Moderate systems.
Remediation script:echo > /etc/securetty
|
Restrict Virtual Console Root Loginsrule
To restrict root logins through the (deprecated) virtual console devices,
ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty :
vc/1
vc/2
vc/3
vc/4
Rationale:
Preventing direct root login to virtual console devices
helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the system
using the root account.
Remediation script:sed -i '/^vc\//d' /etc/securetty
|
Restrict Serial Port Root LoginsruleTo restrict root logins on serial ports,
ensure lines of this form do not appear in /etc/securetty :
ttyS0
ttyS1
Rationale:
Preventing direct root login to serial port interfaces
helps ensure accountability for actions taken on the systems
using the root account.
Remediation script:sed -i '/ttyS/d' /etc/securetty
|
Verify Only Root Has UID 0rule
If any account other than root has a UID of 0, this misconfiguration should
be investigated and the accounts other than root should be removed or
have their UID changed.
If the account is associated with system commands or applications the UID should be changed
to one greater than "0" but less than "1000." Otherwise assign a UID greater than "1000" that
has not already been assigned.
Rationale:
An account has root authority if it has a UID of 0. Multiple accounts
with a UID of 0 afford more opportunity for potential intruders to
guess a password for a privileged account. Proper configuration of
sudo is recommended to afford multiple system administrators
access to root privileges in an accountable manner.
Remediation script:awk -F: '$3 == 0 && $1 != "root" { print $1 }' /etc/passwd | xargs passwd -l
|
Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password
Hashesgroup
By default, password hashes for local accounts are stored
in the second field (colon-separated) in
/etc/shadow . This file should be readable only by
processes running with root credentials, preventing users from
casually accessing others' password hashes and attempting
to crack them.
However, it remains possible to misconfigure the system
and store password hashes
in world-readable files such as /etc/passwd , or
to even store passwords themselves in plaintext on the system.
Using system-provided tools for password change/creation
should allow administrators to avoid such misconfiguration.
|
contains 3 rules |
Prevent Log In to Accounts With Empty PasswordruleIf an account is configured for password authentication
but does not have an assigned password, it may be possible to log
into the account without authentication. Remove any instances of the nullok
option in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to
prevent logins with empty passwords.
Rationale:
If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and
run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with
empty passwords should never be used in operational environments.
Remediation script:sed -i 's/\<nullok\>//g' /etc/pam.d/system-auth
|
Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowedrule
If any password hashes are stored in /etc/passwd (in the second field,
instead of an x ), the cause of this misconfiguration should be
investigated. The account should have its password reset and the hash should be
properly stored, or the account should be deleted entirely.
Rationale:
The hashes for all user account passwords should be stored in
the file /etc/shadow and never in /etc/passwd ,
which is readable by all users.
|
All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/grouprule
Add a group to the system for each GID referenced without a corresponding group.
Rationale:
If a user is assigned the Group Identifier (GID) of a group not existing on the system, and a group
with the Gruop Identifier (GID) is subsequently created, the user may have unintended rights to
any files associated with the group.
|
Set Password Expiration ParametersgroupThe file /etc/login.defs controls several
password-related settings. Programs such as passwd ,
su , and
login consult /etc/login.defs to determine
behavior with regard to password aging, expiration warnings,
and length. See the man page login.defs(5) for more information.
Users should be forced to change their passwords, in order to
decrease the utility of compromised passwords. However, the need to
change passwords often should be balanced against the risk that
users will reuse or write down passwords if forced to change them
too often. Forcing password changes every 90-360 days, depending on
the environment, is recommended. Set the appropriate value as
PASS_MAX_DAYS and apply it to existing accounts with the
-M flag.
The PASS_MIN_DAYS (-m ) setting prevents password
changes for 7 days after the first change, to discourage password
cycling. If you use this setting, train users to contact an administrator
for an emergency password change in case a new password becomes
compromised. The PASS_WARN_AGE (-W ) setting gives
users 7 days of warnings at login time that their passwords are about to expire.
For example, for each existing human user USER, expiration parameters
could be adjusted to a 180 day maximum password age, 7 day minimum password
age, and 7 day warning period with the following command:
$ sudo chage -M 180 -m 7 -W 7 USER
|
contains 2 rules |
Set Password Minimum AgeruleTo specify password minimum age for new accounts,
edit the file /etc/login.defs
and add or correct the following line, replacing DAYS appropriately:
PASS_MIN_DAYS DAYS
A value of 1 day is considered for sufficient for many
environments. The DoD requirement is 1.
Rationale:
Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password changes to defeat
the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If users are allowed to immediately
and continually change their password, then the password could be repeatedly changed in a
short period of time to defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse.
Setting the minimum password age protects against users cycling back to a favorite password
after satisfying the password reuse requirement.
Remediation script:
var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs="1"
grep -q ^PASS_MIN_DAYS /etc/login.defs && \
sed -i "s/PASS_MIN_DAYS.*/PASS_MIN_DAYS $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "PASS_MIN_DAYS $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs
fi
|
Set Password Maximum AgeruleTo specify password maximum age for new accounts,
edit the file /etc/login.defs
and add or correct the following line, replacing DAYS appropriately:
PASS_MAX_DAYS DAYS
A value of 180 days is sufficient for many environments.
The DoD requirement is 60.
Rationale:
Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords
need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does not limit the lifetime
of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the
operating system passwords could be compromised.
Setting the password maximum age ensures users are required to
periodically change their passwords. Requiring shorter password lifetimes
increases the risk of users writing down the password in a convenient
location subject to physical compromise. Remediation script:
var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs="60"
grep -q ^PASS_MAX_DAYS /etc/login.defs && \
sed -i "s/PASS_MAX_DAYS.*/PASS_MAX_DAYS $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs/g" /etc/login.defs
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "PASS_MAX_DAYS $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" >> /etc/login.defs
fi
|
Protect Accounts by Configuring PAMgroupPAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system
which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides
a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured
to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains
guidance on how to accomplish that.
PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are
loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a
user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order
to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able
to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow.
Traditional privileged network listeners
(e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this
requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so
that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still
take advantage of PAM.
PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for
application-specific configuration information. For instance, if
the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's
libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login
to determine what actions should be taken.
One very important file in /etc/pam.d is
/etc/pam.d/system-auth . This file, which is included by
many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication
measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching
authentication changes, for instance when implementing a
centralized authentication service. warning
Be careful when making changes to PAM's
configuration files. The syntax for these files is complex, and
modifications can have unexpected consequences. The default
configurations shipped with applications should be sufficient for
most users. warning
Running authconfig or
system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM configuration
files, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with
a series of system defaults. One reference to the configuration
file syntax can be found at
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/Linux-PAM-html/sag-configuration-file.html. |
contains 13 rules |
Set Password Quality RequirementsgroupThe default pam_pwquality PAM module provides strength
checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as
making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of
at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed,
and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It
can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The
pam_pwquality module is the preferred way of configuring
password requirements.
The pam_cracklib PAM module can also provide strength
checking for passwords as the pam_pwquality module.
It performs a number of checks, such as making sure passwords are
not similar to dictionary words, are of at least a certain length,
are not the previous password reversed, and are not simply a change
of case from the previous password. It can also require passwords to
be in certain character classes.
The man pages pam_pwquality(8) and pam_cracklib(8)
provide information on the capabilities and configuration of
each. |
contains 6 rules |
Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwqualitygroupThe pam_pwquality PAM module can be configured to meet
requirements for a variety of policies.
For example, to configure pam_pwquality to require at least one uppercase
character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special)
character, make sure that pam_pwquality exists in /etc/pam.d/system-auth :
password requisite pam_pwquality.so try_first_pass local_users_only retry=3 authtok_type=
If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth .
Next, modify the settings in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to match the following:
difok = 4
minlen = 14
dcredit = -1
ucredit = -1
lcredit = -1
ocredit = -1
maxrepeat = 3
The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with
your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows.
warning
Note that the password quality
requirements are not enforced for the root account for some
reason. |
contains 6 rules |
Set Password Retry Prompts Permitted Per-SessionruleTo configure the number of retry prompts that are permitted per-session:
Edit the pam_pwquality.so statement in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to
show retry=3 , or a lower value if site policy is more restrictive.
The DoD requirement is a maximum of 3 prompts per session.
Rationale:
Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value
requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and
draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. Note that this
is different from account lockout, which is provided by the pam_faillock module.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_retry="3"
if grep -q "retry=" /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(retry *= *\).*/\1$var_password_pam_retry/" /etc/pam.d/system-auth
else
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/pam_pwquality.so/ s/$/ retry=$var_password_pam_retry/" /etc/pam.d/system-auth
fi
|
Set Password Strength Minimum Digit CharactersruleThe pam_pwquality module's dcredit parameter controls requirements for
usage of digits in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to
contain that many digits. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional
length credit for each digit. Modify the dcredit setting in
/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a digit in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required
to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of
the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force
attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes
to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of
possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Requiring digits makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger
search space.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_dcredit="1"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/security/pwquality.conf' '^dcredit' $var_password_pam_dcredit 'CCE-27214-6' '%s = %s'
|
Set Password Minimum LengthruleThe pam_pwquality module's minlen parameter controls requirements for
minimum characters required in a password. Add minlen=15
after pam_pwquality to set minimum password length requirements.
Rationale:
The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations
that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a
password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength
and how long it takes to crack a password. Use of more characters in a password
helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to
compromose the password.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_minlen="15"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/security/pwquality.conf' '^minlen' $var_password_pam_minlen 'CCE-27293-0' '%s = %s'
|
Set Password Strength Minimum Uppercase CharactersruleThe pam_pwquality module's ucredit= parameter controls requirements for
usage of uppercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to
contain that many uppercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional
length credit for each uppercase character. Modify the ucredit setting in
/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of an uppercase character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources reuiqred to compromise the password.
Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts
at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more
complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before
the password is compromised.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_ucredit="1"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/security/pwquality.conf' '^ucredit' $var_password_pam_ucredit 'CCE-27200-5' '%s = %s'
|
Set Password Strength Minimum Special CharactersruleThe pam_pwquality module's ocredit= parameter controls requirements for
usage of special (or "other") characters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be
required to contain that many special characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1
additional length credit for each special character. Modify the ocredit setting in
/etc/security/pwquality.conf to equal 1 to require use of a special character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required
to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of
the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force
attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes
to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of
possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Requiring a minimum number of special characters makes password guessing attacks
more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_ocredit="1"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/security/pwquality.conf' '^ocredit' $var_password_pam_ocredit 'CCE-27360-7' '%s = %s'
|
Set Password Strength Minimum Lowercase CharactersruleThe pam_pwquality module's lcredit parameter controls requirements for
usage of lowercase letters in a password. When set to a negative number, any password will be required to
contain that many lowercase characters. When set to a positive number, pam_pwquality will grant +1 additional
length credit for each lowercase character. Modify the lcredit setting in
/etc/security/pwquality.conf to require the use of a lowercase character in passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required
to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of
the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force
attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes
to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of
possble combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Requiring a minimum number of lowercase characters makes password guessing attacks
more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Remediation script:
var_password_pam_lcredit="1"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/security/pwquality.conf' '^lcredit' $var_password_pam_lcredit 'CCE-27345-8' '%s = %s'
|
Set Lockouts for Failed Password AttemptsgroupThe pam_faillock PAM module provides the capability to
lock out user accounts after a number of failed login attempts. Its
documentation is available in
/usr/share/doc/pam-VERSION/txts/README.pam_faillock .
warning
Locking out user accounts presents the
risk of a denial-of-service attack. The lockout policy
must weigh whether the risk of such a
denial-of-service attack outweighs the benefits of thwarting
password guessing attacks. |
contains 3 rules |
Set Deny For Failed Password Attemptsrule
To configure the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login
attempts using pam_faillock.so , modify the content of both
/etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:
- add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
account required pam_faillock.so
Rationale:
Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts
prevents direct password guessing attacks.
Remediation script:
var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny="3"
AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
# pam_faillock.so already present?
if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then
# pam_faillock.so present, deny directive present?
if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*deny=" $pamFile; then
# both pam_faillock.so & deny present, just correct deny directive value
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(deny *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(deny *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
# pam_faillock.so present, but deny directive not yet
else
# append correct deny value to appropriate places
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny/" $pamFile
fi
# pam_faillock.so not present yet
else
# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'deny' option
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_deny" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account required pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
fi
done
|
Set Lockout Time For Failed Password Attemptsrule
To configure the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login
attempts and require an administrator to unlock the account using pam_faillock.so ,
modify the content of both /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:
- add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
account required pam_faillock.so
Rationale:
Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts
prevents direct password guessing attacks. Ensuring that an administrator is
involved in unlocking locked accounts draws appropriate attention to such
situations.
Remediation script:
var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time="604800"
AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
# pam_faillock.so already present?
if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then
# pam_faillock.so present, unlock_time directive present?
if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*unlock_time=" $pamFile; then
# both pam_faillock.so & unlock_time present, just correct unlock_time directive value
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(unlock_time *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(unlock_time *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
# pam_faillock.so present, but unlock_time directive not yet
else
# append correct unlock_time value to appropriate places
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time/" $pamFile
fi
# pam_faillock.so not present yet
else
# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'unlock_time' option
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail unlock_time=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_unlock_time" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account required pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
fi
done
|
Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attemptsrule
Utilizing pam_faillock.so , the fail_interval directive configures the system to lock out accounts after a number of incorrect login
attempts. Modify the content of both /etc/pam.d/system-auth and /etc/pam.d/password-auth as follows:
- add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
after the pam_unix.so statement in the AUTH section:
auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock_time=604800 fail_interval=900 - add the following line immediately
before the pam_unix.so statement in the ACCOUNT section:
account required pam_faillock.so
Rationale:
Locking out user accounts after a number of incorrect attempts within a
specific period of time prevents direct password guessing attacks.
Remediation script:
var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval="900"
AUTH_FILES[0]="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
AUTH_FILES[1]="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
for pamFile in "${AUTH_FILES[@]}"
do
# pam_faillock.so already present?
if grep -q "^auth.*pam_faillock.so.*" $pamFile; then
# pam_faillock.so present, 'fail_interval' directive present?
if grep -q "^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*fail_interval=" $pamFile; then
# both pam_faillock.so & 'fail_interval' present, just correct 'fail_interval' directive value
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*\)\(fail_interval *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/\(^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*\)\(fail_interval *= *\).*/\1\2$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
# pam_faillock.so present, but 'fail_interval' directive not yet
else
# append correct 'fail_interval' value to appropriate places
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*required.*pam_faillock.so.*preauth.*silent.*/ s/$/ fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*[default=die].*pam_faillock.so.*authfail.*/ s/$/ fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval/" $pamFile
fi
# pam_faillock.so not present yet
else
# insert pam_faillock.so preauth & authfail rows with proper value of the 'fail_interval' option
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/i auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^auth.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*/a auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail fail_interval=$var_accounts_passwords_pam_faillock_fail_interval" $pamFile
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^account.*required.*pam_unix.so/i account required pam_faillock.so" $pamFile
fi
done
|
Set Password Hashing AlgorithmgroupThe system's default algorithm for storing password hashes in
/etc/shadow is SHA-512. This can be configured in several
locations. |
contains 3 rules |
Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithmrule
The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted representations of passwords.
In /etc/pam.d/system-auth , the password section of the file controls
which PAM modules execute during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so
module in the password section to include the argument sha512 , as shown below:
password sufficient pam_unix.so sha512 other arguments...
This will help ensure when local users change their passwords, hashes for the new
passwords will be generated using the SHA-512 algorithm. This is the default.
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting
passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily
compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they
are kepy in plain text.
This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only
encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option
ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
Remediation script:if ! grep -q "^password.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so.*sha512" /etc/pam.d/system-auth; then
sed -i --follow-symlinks "/^password.*sufficient.*pam_unix.so/ s/$/ sha512/" /etc/pam.d/system-auth
fi
|
Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defsrule
In /etc/login.defs , add or correct the following line to ensure
the system will use SHA-512 as the hashing algorithm:
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords.
If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords
that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text.
Using a stronger hashing algorithm makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
Remediation script:if grep --silent ^ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs ; then
sed -i 's/^ENCRYPT_METHOD.*/ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512/g' /etc/login.defs
else
echo "" >> /etc/login.defs
echo "ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512" >> /etc/login.defs
fi
|
Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/libuser.confrule
In /etc/libuser.conf , add or correct the following line in its
[defaults] section to ensure the system will use the SHA-512
algorithm for password hashing:
crypt_style = sha512
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting
passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily
compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they
are kepy in plain text.
This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only
encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option
ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
|
Set Last Logon/Access NotificationruleTo configure the system to notify users of last logon/access
using pam_lastlog , add or correct the pam_lastlog settings in
/etc/pam.d/postlogin to read as follows:
session [success=1 default=ignore] pam_succeed_if.so service !~ gdm* service !~ su* quiet
session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so nowtmp showfailed
session optional pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed
Rationale:
Users need to be aware of activity that occurs regarding
their account. Providing users with information regarding the number
of unsuccessful attempts that were made to login to their account
allows the user to determine if any unauthorized activity has occurred
and gives them an opportunity to notify administrators.
Remediation script:
if ! `grep -q ^[^#].*pam_succeed_if.*showfailed /etc/pam.d/postlogin` ; then
if ! grep `^session.*pam_succeed_if.so /etc/pam.d/postlogin` ; then
echo "session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so nowtmp showfailed" >> /etc/pam.d/postlogin
echo "session optional pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed" >> /etc/pam.d/postlogin
else
sed -i '/^session.*pam_succeed_if.so/a session\t optional\t pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed' /etc/pam.d/postlogin
sed -i '/^session.*pam_succeed_if.so/a session\t [default=1]\t pam_lastlog.so nowtmp showfailed' /etc/pam.d/postlogin
fi
else
sed -i "s/session[ ]*\[default=1][ ]*pam_lastlog.so.*/session [default=1] pam_lastlog.so nowtmp showfailed/g" /etc/pam.d/postlogin
sed -i "s/session[ ]*optional[ ]*pam_lastlog.so.*/session optional pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed/g" /etc/pam.d/postlogin
fi
|
Secure Session Configuration Files for Login AccountsgroupWhen a user logs into a Unix account, the system
configures the user's session by reading a number of files. Many of
these files are located in the user's home directory, and may have
weak permissions as a result of user error or misconfiguration. If
an attacker can modify or even read certain types of account
configuration information, they can often gain full access to the
affected user's account. Therefore, it is important to test and
correct configuration file permissions for interactive accounts,
particularly those of privileged users such as root or system
administrators. |
contains 2 rules |
Set Interactive Session Timeoutrule
Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces
the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a
management session enabled on the console or console port that has been
left unattended.
Rationale:
|
Limit the Number of Concurrent Login Sessions Allowed Per Userrule
Limiting the number of allowed users and sessions per user can limit risks related to Denial of
Service attacks. This addresses concurrent sessions for a single account and does not address
concurrent sessions by a single user via multiple accounts. To set the number of concurrent
sessions per user add the following line in /etc/security/limits.conf :
* hard maxlogins 10
Rationale:Limiting simultaneous user logins can insulate the system from denial of service
problems caused by excessive logins. Automated login processes operating improperly or
maliciously may result in an exceptional number of simultaneous login sessions.
Remediation script:
var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions="10"
echo "* hard maxlogins $var_accounts_max_concurrent_login_sessions" >> /etc/security/limits.conf
|
Protect Physical Console AccessgroupIt is impossible to fully protect a system from an
attacker with physical access, so securing the space in which the
system is located should be considered a necessary step. However,
there are some steps which, if taken, make it more difficult for an
attacker to quickly or undetectably modify a system from its
console. |
contains 5 rules |
Set Boot Loader PasswordgroupDuring the boot process, the boot loader is
responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing
options to it. The boot loader allows for the selection of
different kernels - possibly on different partitions or media.
The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux boot loader for x86 systems is called GRUB2.
Options it can pass to the kernel include single-user mode, which
provides root access without any authentication, and the ability to
disable SELinux. To prevent local users from modifying the boot
parameters and endangering security, protect the boot loader configuration
with a password and ensure its configuration file's permissions
are set properly.
|
contains 1 rule |
Set Boot Loader PasswordruleThe grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password
protection enabled to protect boot-time settings.
To do so, select a superuser account and password and add them into the
appropriate grub2 configuration file(s) under /etc/grub.d .
Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the pasword
by running the following command:
$ grub2-mkpasswd-pbkdf2
When prompted, enter the password that was selected and insert the returned
password hash into the appropriate grub2 configuration file(s) under
/etc/grub.d immediately after the superuser account.
(Use the output from grub2-mkpasswd-pbkdf2 as the value of
password-hash):
password_pbkdf2 superusers-account password-hash
NOTE: It is recommended not to use common administrator account names like root,
admin, or administrator for the grub2 superuser account.
To meet FISMA Moderate, the bootloader superuser account and password MUST
differ from the root account and password.
Once the superuser account and password have been added, update the
grub.cfg file by running:
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
NOTE: Do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the
grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file.
Rationale:
Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures
users with physical access cannot trivially alter
important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use,
and whether to enter single-user mode. For more information on how to configure
the grub2 superuser account and password, please refer to
- https://docs.redhat.com/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/sec-GRUB_2_Password_Protection.html
.
|
Configure Screen LockinggroupWhen a user must temporarily leave an account
logged-in, screen locking should be employed to prevent passersby
from abusing the account. User education and training is
particularly important for screen locking to be effective, and policies
can be implemented to reinforce this.
Automatic screen locking is only meant as a safeguard for
those cases where a user forgot to lock the screen. |
contains 1 rule |
Configure Console Screen Lockinggroup
A console screen locking mechanism is provided in the
screen package, which is not installed by default.
|
contains 1 rule |
Install the screen Packagerule
To enable console screen locking, install the screen package:
$ sudo yum install screen
Instruct users to begin new terminal sessions with the following command:
$ screen
The console can now be locked with the following key combination:
ctrl+a x
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate
physical vicinity of the information system but des not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence.
Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operation system session prior to vacating the vicinity,
operating systems need to be able to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate the
session lock.
The screen package allows for a session lock to be implemented and configured.
Remediation script:yum -y install screen
|
Require Authentication for Single User ModeruleSingle-user mode is intended as a system recovery
method, providing a single user root access to the system by
providing a boot option at startup. By default, no authentication
is performed if single-user mode is selected.
By default, single-user mode is protected by requiring a password and is set
in /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service .
Rationale:
This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security
on the machine and gaining root access. Such accesses are further prevented
by configuring the bootloader password.
Remediation script:grep -q sulogin /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
sed -i "s/-c \"/-c \"\/sbin\/sulogin; /g" /usr/lib/systemd/system/rescue.service
fi
|
Disable debug-shell SystemD ServiceruleSystemD's debug-shell service is intended to
diagnose SystemD related boot issues with various systemctl
commands. Once enabled and following a system reboot, the root shell
will be available on tty9 which is access by pressing
CTRL-ALT-F9 . The debug-shell service should only be used
for SystemD related issues and should otherwise be disabled.
By default, the debug-shell SystemD service is disabled.
The debug-shell service can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable debug-shell.service
Rationale:
This prevents attackers with physical access from trivially bypassing security
on the machine through valid troubleshooting configurations and gaining root
access when the system is rebooted.
Remediation script:
function service_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
echo
echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
echo "as the last argument"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
service_util="/sbin/service"
chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi
# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
service_state="enable"
service_operation="start"
chkconfig_state="on"
else
service_state="disable"
service_operation="stop"
chkconfig_state="off"
fi
# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
$service_util $service $service_operation
$chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
$service_util $service_operation $service
$service_util $service_state $service
fi
# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \
if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
else
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
fi
fi
}
service_command disable debug-shell.service
|
Verify that Interactive Boot is Disabledrule
Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems support an "interactive boot" option that can
be used to prevent services from being started. On a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
system, interactive boot can be enabled by providing a 1 ,
yes , true , or on value to the
systemd.confirm_spawn kernel argument in /etc/default/grub .
Remove any instance of systemd.confirm_spawn=(1|yes|true|on) from
the kernel arguments in that file to disable interactive boot.
warning
The GRUB 2 configuration file, grub.cfg ,
is automatically updated each time a new kernel is installed. Note that any
changes to /etc/default/grub require rebuilding the grub.cfg
file. To update the GRUB 2 configuration file manually, use the
grub2-mkconfig -o command as follows:
Rationale:
Using interactive boot, the console user could disable auditing, firewalls,
or other services, weakening system security.
Remediation script:
# Systemd confirm_spawn regex to search for and delete if found
CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX="systemd.confirm_spawn=\(1\|yes\|true\|on\)"
# Modify both the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT directives
for grubcmdline in "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX" "GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT"
do
# Remove 'systemd.confirm_spawn' argument from /etc/default/grub if found
if grep -q "^${grubcmdline}=\".*${CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX}.*\"" /etc/default/grub
then
# Remove all three possible occurrences of CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX:
# At the start
sed -i "s/\"${CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX} /\"/" /etc/default/grub
# At the end
sed -i "s/ ${CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX}\"$/\"/" /etc/default/grub
# In the middle
sed -i "s/ ${CONFIRM_SPAWN_REGEX}//" /etc/default/grub
fi
done
# Remove 'systemd.confirm_spawn' kernel argument also from runtime settings
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --remove-args="systemd.confirm_spawn"
|
Network Configuration and FirewallsgroupMost machines must be connected to a network of some
sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network
attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions
about networking which must be made when configuring a system.
This section also discusses firewalls, network access
controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow
system-level rules to be written that can limit an attackers' ability
to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network
traffic should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses,
hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the
system's network services are available to particular hosts or
networks. |
contains 13 rules |
Kernel Parameters Which Affect NetworkinggroupThe sysctl utility is used to set
parameters which affect the operation of the Linux kernel. Kernel parameters
which affect networking and have security implications are described here.
|
contains 7 rules |
Network Parameters for Hosts OnlygroupIf the system is not going to be used as a router, then setting certain
kernel parameters ensure that the host will not perform routing
of network traffic. |
contains 2 rules |
Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects by Defaultrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
Rationale:ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more
direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information
from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.
Remediation script:#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i 's/^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects for All Interfacesrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
Rationale:ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more
direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information
from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.
Remediation script:#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i 's/^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0/g' /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects to 0 per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Network Related Kernel Runtime Parameters for Hosts and RoutersgroupCertain kernel parameters should be set for systems which are
acting as either hosts or routers to improve the system's ability defend
against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks. |
contains 5 rules |
Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects for All Interfacesrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct
route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table
and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle
attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless
absolutely required. Remediation script:
sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value="disabled"
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value
#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets By Defaultrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Rationale:Source-routed packates allow the source of the packet to suggest routers
forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can
be used to bypass network security measures.
Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate
uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required, such as when
IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is legitimately functioning as
a router. Remediation script:
sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value="disabled"
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value
#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects By Defaultrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct
route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table
and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle
attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless
absolutely required. Remediation script:
sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value="disabled"
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value
#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
# else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*/net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects to $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = $sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Configure Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requestsrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
Rationale:Responding to broadcast (ICMP) echoes facilitates network mapping
and provides a vector for amplification attacks.
Ignoring ICMP echo requests (pings) sent to broadcast or multicast
addresses makes the system slightly more difficult to enumerate on the network.
Remediation script:
sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value="1"
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value
#
# If net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
# else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*/net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts to $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = $sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Configure Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookiesrule
To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter,
run the following command:
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
If this is not the system's default value, add the following line to /etc/sysctl.conf :
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
Rationale: A TCP SYN flood attack can cause a denial of service by filling a
system's TCP connection table with connections in the SYN_RCVD state.
Syncookies can be used to track a connection when a subsequent ACK is received,
verifying the initiator is attempting a valid connection and is not a flood
source. This feature is activated when a flood condition is detected, and
enables the system to continue servicing valid connection requests.
Remediation script:
sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value="1"
#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies
#
/sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value
#
# If net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
# else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#
if grep --silent ^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies /etc/sysctl.conf ; then
sed -i "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*/net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = $sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value/g" /etc/sysctl.conf
else
echo -e "\n# Set net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies to $sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value per security requirements" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = $sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value" >> /etc/sysctl.conf
fi
|
Wireless NetworkinggroupWireless networking, such as 802.11
(WiFi) and Bluetooth, can present a security risk to sensitive or
classified systems and networks. Wireless networking hardware is
much more likely to be included in laptop or portable systems than
in desktops or servers.
Removal of hardware provides the greatest assurance that the wireless
capability remains disabled. Acquisition policies often include provisions to
prevent the purchase of equipment that will be used in sensitive spaces and
includes wireless capabilities. If it is impractical to remove the wireless
hardware, and policy permits the device to enter sensitive spaces as long
as wireless is disabled, efforts should instead focus on disabling wireless capability
via software. |
contains 4 rules |
Disable Wireless Through Software ConfigurationgroupIf it is impossible to remove the wireless hardware
from the device in question, disable as much of it as possible
through software. The following methods can disable software
support for wireless networking, but note that these methods do not
prevent malicious software or careless users from re-activating the
devices. |
contains 4 rules |
Disable WiFi or Bluetooth in BIOSruleSome systems that include built-in wireless support offer the
ability to disable the device through the BIOS. This is system-specific;
consult your hardware manual or explore the BIOS setup during
boot. Rationale:Disabling wireless support in the BIOS prevents easy
activation of the wireless interface, generally requiring administrators
to reboot the system first.
|
Deactivate Wireless Network InterfacesruleDeactivating wireless network interfaces should prevent
normal usage of the wireless capability.
First, identify the interfaces available with the command:
$ ifconfig -a
Additionally, the following command may be used to
determine whether wireless support is included for a
particular interface, though this may not always be a clear
indicator:
$ iwconfig
After identifying any wireless interfaces (which may have
names like wlan0 , ath0 , wifi0 , em1 or
eth0 ), deactivate the interface with the command:
$ sudo ifdown interface
These changes will only last until the next reboot. To
disable the interface for future boots, remove the appropriate
interface file from /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts :
$ sudo rm /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-interface
Rationale:Wireless networking allows attackers within physical proximity to
launch network-based attacks against systems, including those against local LAN
protocols which were not designed with security in mind.
|
Disable Bluetooth Servicerule
The bluetooth service can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable bluetooth.service
$ sudo service bluetooth stop
Rationale:Disabling the bluetooth service prevents the system from attempting
connections to Bluetooth devices, which entails some security risk.
Nevertheless, variation in this risk decision may be expected due to the
utility of Bluetooth connectivity and its limited range. Remediation script:grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/bluetooth && \
sed -i 's/disable.*/disable = yes/gI' /etc/xinetd.d/bluetooth
#
# Disable bluetooth.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable bluetooth.service
#
# Stop bluetooth.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop bluetooth.service
|
Disable Bluetooth Kernel ModulesruleThe kernel's module loading system can be configured to prevent
loading of the Bluetooth module. Add the following to
the appropriate /etc/modprobe.d configuration file
to prevent the loading of the Bluetooth module:
install bluetooth /bin/true
Rationale:If Bluetooth functionality must be disabled, preventing the kernel
from loading the kernel module provides an additional safeguard against its
activation. Remediation script:echo "install bluetooth /bin/true" > /etc/modprobe.d/bluetooth.conf
|
firewalldgroupThe dynamic firewall daemon firewalld provides a
dynamically managed firewall with support for network “zones” to assign
a level of trust to a network and its associated connections and interfaces.
It has support for IPv4 and IPv6 firewall settings. It supports Ethernet
bridges and has a separation of runtime and permanent configuration options.
It also has an interface for services or applications to add firewall rules
directly.
A graphical configuration tool, firewall-config , is used to configure
firewalld , which in turn uses iptables tool to communicate
with Netfilter in the kernel which implements packet filtering.
The firewall service provided by firewalld is dynamic rather than
static because changes to the configuration can be made at anytime and are
immediately implemented. There is no need to save or apply the changes. No
unintended disruption of existing network connections occurs as no part of
the firewall has to be reloaded.
|
contains 2 rules |
Inspect and Activate Default firewalld RulesgroupFirewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones
based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and
traffic within that network. NetworkManager informs firewalld to which
zone an interface belongs. An interface's assigned zone can be changed by
NetworkManager or via the firewall-config tool.
The zone settings in /etc/firewalld/ are a range of preset settings
which can be quickly applied to a network interface. These are the zones
provided by firewalld sorted according to the default trust level of the
zones from untrusted to trusted:
drop
Any incoming network packets are dropped, there is no
reply. Only outgoing network connections are possible. block
Any incoming network connections are rejected with an
icmp-host-prohibited message for IPv4 and icmp6-adm-prohibited
for IPv6. Only network connections initiated from within the system are
possible. public
For use in public areas. You do not trust the other
computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming
connections are accepted. external
For use on external networks with masquerading enabled
especially for routers. You do not trust the other computers on the network to
not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted. dmz
For computers in your demilitarized zone that are
publicly-accessible with limited access to your internal network. Only selected
incoming connections are accepted. work
For use in work areas. You mostly trust the other computers
on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are
accepted. home
For use in home areas. You mostly trust the other computers
on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are
accepted. internal
For use on internal networks. You mostly trust the
other computers on the networks to not harm your computer. Only selected
incoming connections are accepted. trusted
All network connections are accepted.
It is possible to designate one of these zones to be the default zone. When
interface connections are added to NetworkManager , they are assigned
to the default zone. On installation, the default zone in firewalld is set to
be the public zone.
To find out all the settings of a zone, for example the public zone,
enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
Example output of this command might look like the following:
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
public
interfaces:
services: mdns dhcpv6-client ssh
ports:
forward-ports:
icmp-blocks: source-quench
To view the network zones currently active, enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --get-service
The following listing displays the result of this command on common Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 7 Server system:
# firewall-cmd --get-service
amanda-client bacula bacula-client dhcp dhcpv6 dhcpv6-client dns ftp
high-availability http https imaps ipp ipp-client ipsec kerberos kpasswd
ldap ldaps libvirt libvirt-tls mdns mountd ms-wbt mysql nfs ntp openvpn
pmcd pmproxy pmwebapi pmwebapis pop3s postgresql proxy-dhcp radius rpc-bind
samba samba-client smtp ssh telnet tftp tftp-client transmission-client
vnc-server wbem-https
Finally to view the network zones that will be active after the next firewalld
service reload, enter the following command as root:
# firewall-cmd --get-service --permanent
|
contains 1 rule |
Verify firewalld Enabledrule
The firewalld service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable firewalld.service
Rationale:
Access control methods provide the ability to enhance system security posture
by restricting services and known good IP addresses and address ranges. This
prevents connections from unknown hosts and protocols.
Remediation script:#
# Enable firewalld.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable firewalld.service
#
# Start firewalld.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start firewalld.service
|
Strengthen the Default RulesetgroupThe default rules can be strengthened. The system
scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined
in configuration files under the /etc/firewalld/services
and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.
The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the
default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this
configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to
the firewall-cmd program to load in rules under the /etc/firewalld/services
and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.
Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address
conventions for regular firewalld rules are used throughout this section.
warning
The program firewall-config
allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules
and automatically adjusts the firewalld ruleset(s). |
contains 1 rule |
Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming PacketsruleTo set the default zone to drop for
the built-in default zone which processes incoming IPv4 and IPv6 packets,
modify the following line in
/etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to be:
DefaultZone=drop
Rationale:In firewalld the default zone is applied only after all
the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the
default zone to drop implements proper design for a firewall, i.e.
any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be
accepted. Remediation script:grep -q ^DefaultZone= /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf && \
sed -i "s/DefaultZone=.*/DefaultZone=drop/g" /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "DefaultZone=drop" >> /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf
fi
|
Configure SysloggroupThe syslog service has been the default Unix logging mechanism for
many years. It has a number of downsides, including inconsistent log format,
lack of authentication for received messages, and lack of authentication,
encryption, or reliable transport for messages sent over a network. However,
due to its long history, syslog is a de facto standard which is supported by
almost all Unix applications.
In Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, rsyslog has replaced ksyslogd as the
syslog daemon of choice, and it includes some additional security features
such as reliable, connection-oriented (i.e. TCP) transmission of logs, the
option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log data en route to
a central logging server.
This section discusses how to configure rsyslog for
best effect, and how to use tools provided with the system to maintain and
monitor logs. |
contains 1 rule |
Rsyslog Logs Sent To Remote Hostgroup
If system logs are to be useful in detecting malicious
activities, it is necessary to send logs to a remote server. An
intruder who has compromised the root account on a machine may
delete the log entries which indicate that the system was attacked
before they are seen by an administrator.
However, it is recommended that logs be stored on the local
host in addition to being sent to the loghost, especially if
rsyslog has been configured to use the UDP protocol to send
messages over a network. UDP does not guarantee reliable delivery,
and moderately busy sites will lose log messages occasionally,
especially in periods of high traffic which may be the result of an
attack. In addition, remote rsyslog messages are not
authenticated in any way by default, so it is easy for an attacker to
introduce spurious messages to the central log server. Also, some
problems cause loss of network connectivity, which will prevent the
sending of messages to the central server. For all of these reasons, it is
better to store log messages both centrally and on each host, so
that they can be correlated if necessary. |
contains 1 rule |
Ensure Logs Sent To Remote Hostrule
To configure rsyslog to send logs to a remote log server,
open /etc/rsyslog.conf and read and understand the last section of the file,
which describes the multiple directives necessary to activate remote
logging.
Along with these other directives, the system can be configured
to forward its logs to a particular log server by
adding or correcting one of the following lines,
substituting loghost.example.com appropriately.
The choice of protocol depends on the environment of the system;
although TCP and RELP provide more reliable message delivery,
they may not be supported in all environments.
To use UDP for log message delivery:
*.* @loghost.example.com
To use TCP for log message delivery:
*.* @@loghost.example.com
To use RELP for log message delivery:
*.* :omrelp:loghost.example.com
Rationale:A log server (loghost) receives syslog messages from one or more
systems. This data can be used as an additional log source in the event a
system is compromised and its local logs are suspect. Forwarding log messages
to a remote loghost also provides system administrators with a centralized
place to view the status of multiple hosts within the enterprise.
|
System Accounting with auditdgroupThe audit service provides substantial capabilities
for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about
SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events
such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication
events performed by programs such as sudo.
Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space
requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance.
NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use
the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules )
located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create
the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file
during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd
daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the
/etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup,
and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the
appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the
/usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file.
To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program
to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting:
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file.
In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules, use the following setting:
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file.
Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service
configuration file for further details.
Government networks often have substantial auditing
requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these
requirements.
Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system
satisfies common requirements.
The following example from Fedora Documentation available at
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/SELinux_Users_and_Administrators_Guide/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Troubleshooting-Fixing_Problems.html#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages
shows the substantial amount of information captured in a
two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important
fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC
denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP
Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with
the samba_share_t type):
type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd"
path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13
a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48
gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd"
exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null)
msg=audit(1226874073.147:96) - The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time)
for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the
date command.
{ getattr } - The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied.
getattr
indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information.
This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being
accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr ,
read , and write .
comm="httpd" - The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is
found in the
exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL ) message,
which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" .
path="/var/www/html/file1" - The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access.
scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0" - The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In
this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running
in the
httpd_t domain.
tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0" - The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access.
In this case, it is the SELinux context of
file1 . Note: the samba_share_t
type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain.
- From the system call (
SYSCALL ) message, two items are of interest:
success=no : indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not.
success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied
access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can
be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t
and kernel_t .
exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" : the full path to the executable that launched
the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" .
|
contains 41 rules |
Configure auditd Data Retentiongroup
The audit system writes data to /var/log/audit/audit.log . By default,
auditd rotates 5 logs by size (6MB), retaining a maximum of 30MB of
data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too
full. This minimizes the risk of audit data filling its partition
and impacting other services. This also minimizes the risk of the audit
daemon temporarily disabling the system if it cannot write audit log (which
it can be configured to do).
For a busy
system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, the default settings
for data retention may be
insufficient. The log file size needed will depend heavily on what types
of events are being audited. First configure auditing to log all the events of
interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what file
size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period.
Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the
auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they fill, and,
more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from filling the
partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and
therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless configured to do so.) Some
machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited.
If this is the case, then auditd can be configured to halt the machine
if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated,
configuring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being
rotated away before they can be viewed.
If your system is configured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make
sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that
/var/log/audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is
larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain
normally.
references:
AU-11, 138 |
contains 8 rules |
Configure auditd Number of Logs RetainedruleDetermine how many log files
auditd should retain when it rotates logs.
Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf . Add or modify the following
line, substituting NUMLOGS with the correct value of 5:
num_logs = NUMLOGS
Set the value to 5 for general-purpose systems.
Note that values less than 2 result in no log rotation.Rationale:The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain
log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum log
file size and the number of logs retained. Remediation script:
var_auditd_num_logs="5"
AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf
grep -q ^num_logs $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^num_logs.*/num_logs = '"$var_auditd_num_logs"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "num_logs = $var_auditd_num_logs" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
|
Configure auditd Max Log File SizeruleDetermine the amount of audit data (in megabytes)
which should be retained in each log file. Edit the file
/etc/audit/auditd.conf . Add or modify the following line, substituting
the correct value of 6 for STOREMB:
max_log_file = STOREMB
Set the value to 6 (MB) or higher for general-purpose systems.
Larger values, of course,
support retention of even more audit data.Rationale:The total storage for audit log files must be large enough to retain
log information over the period required. This is a function of the maximum
log file size and the number of logs retained. Remediation script:
var_auditd_max_log_file="6"
AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf
grep -q ^max_log_file $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^max_log_file.*/max_log_file = '"$var_auditd_max_log_file"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "max_log_file = $var_auditd_max_log_file" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
|
Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Sizerule The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size
is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken
by auditd , add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf :
max_log_file_action = ACTION
Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man
page. These include:
ignore syslog suspend rotate keep_logs
Set the ACTION to rotate to ensure log rotation
occurs. This is the default. The setting is case-insensitive.
Rationale:Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate )
minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by
being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard
log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space,
keep_logs can be employed. Remediation script:
var_auditd_max_log_file_action="rotate"
AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf
grep -q ^max_log_file_action $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^max_log_file_action.*/max_log_file_action = '"$var_auditd_max_log_file_action"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "max_log_file_action = $var_auditd_max_log_file_action" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
|
Configure auditd space_left Action on Low Disk SpaceruleThe auditd service can be configured to take an action
when disk space starts to run low.
Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf . Modify the following line,
substituting ACTION appropriately:
space_left_action = ACTION
Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page.
These include:
ignore syslog email exec suspend single halt
Set this to email (instead of the default,
which is suspend ) as it is more likely to get prompt attention. Acceptable values
also include suspend , single , and halt .
Rationale:Notifying administrators of an impending disk space problem may
allow them to take corrective action prior to any disruption. Remediation script:
var_auditd_space_left_action="email"
grep -q ^space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \
sed -i "s/space_left_action.*/space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "space_left_action = $var_auditd_space_left_action" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf
fi
|
Configure auditd admin_space_left Action on Low Disk SpaceruleThe auditd service can be configured to take an action
when disk space is running low but prior to running out of space completely.
Edit the file /etc/audit/auditd.conf . Add or modify the following line,
substituting ACTION appropriately:
admin_space_left_action = ACTION
Set this value to single to cause the system to switch to single user
mode for corrective action. Acceptable values also include suspend and
halt . For certain systems, the need for availability
outweighs the need to log all actions, and a different setting should be
determined. Details regarding all possible values for ACTION are described in the
auditd.conf man page.
Rationale:Administrators should be made aware of an inability to record
audit records. If a separate partition or logical volume of adequate size
is used, running low on space for audit records should never occur.
Remediation script:
var_auditd_admin_space_left_action="single"
grep -q ^admin_space_left_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf && \
sed -i "s/admin_space_left_action.*/admin_space_left_action = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_action/g" /etc/audit/auditd.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "admin_space_left_action = $var_auditd_admin_space_left_action" >> /etc/audit/auditd.conf
fi
|
Configure auditd mail_acct Action on Low Disk SpaceruleThe auditd service can be configured to send email to
a designated account in certain situations. Add or correct the following line
in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that administrators are notified
via email for those situations:
action_mail_acct = root
Rationale:Email sent to the root account is typically aliased to the
administrators of the system, who can take appropriate action. Remediation script:
var_auditd_action_mail_acct="root"
AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf
grep -q ^action_mail_acct $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^action_mail_acct.*/action_mail_acct = '"$var_auditd_action_mail_acct"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "action_mail_acct = $var_auditd_action_mail_acct" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
|
Configure auditd flush priorityruleThe auditd service can be configured to
synchronously write audit event data to disk. Add or correct the following
line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to ensure that audit event data is
fully synchronized with the log files on the disk:
flush = data
Rationale:Audit data should be synchronously written to disk to ensure
log integrity. These parameters assure that all audit event data is fully
synchronized with the log files on the disk. Remediation script:
var_auditd_flush="data"
AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf
# if flush is present, flush param edited to var_auditd_flush
# else flush param is defined by var_auditd_flush
#
# the freq param is only used value 'incremental' and will be
# commented out if flush != incremental
#
# if flush == incremental && freq param is not defined, it
# will be defined as the package-default value of 20
grep -q ^flush $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^flush.*/flush = '"$var_auditd_flush"'/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "flush = $var_auditd_flush" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
if ! [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ]; then
sed -i 's/^freq/##freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG
elif [ "$var_auditd_flush" == "incremental" ]; then
grep -q freq $AUDITCONFIG && \
sed -i 's/^#\+freq/freq/g' $AUDITCONFIG
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "freq = 20" >> $AUDITCONFIG
fi
fi
|
Configure auditd to use audispd's syslog pluginruleTo configure the auditd service to use the
syslog plug-in of the audispd audit event multiplexor, set
the active line in /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf to
yes . Restart the auditd service:
$ sudo service auditd restart
Rationale:The auditd service does not include the ability to send audit
records to a centralized server for management directly. It does, however,
include a plug-in for audit event multiplexor (audispd) to pass audit records
to the local syslog server Remediation script:
grep -q ^active /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf && \
sed -i "s/active.*/active = yes/g" /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "active = yes" >> /etc/audisp/plugins.d/syslog.conf
fi
|
Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive AuditinggroupThe auditd program can perform comprehensive
monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended
configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full
description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the
scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists
to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system.
The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including:
- Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number)
on entry or exit.
- Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with
some limitations), etc.
- Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's
contents or metadata.
Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules .
Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization.
Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments
that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested
during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and
in the related man pages for more details.
If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION ,
be sure to comment out the
lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's
architecture. Then review and understand the following rules,
ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate
architecture.
After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and
editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows:
$ sudo service auditd restart
|
contains 31 rules |
Records Events that Modify Date and Time InformationgroupArbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time. All changes to the system
time should be audited. |
contains 5 rules |
Record attempts to alter time through adjtimexruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be
used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple
system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is
not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
Rationale:Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes
to the system time should be audited. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 5.2.4, Req-10.4.2.b, 1487, 169 Remediation script:
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {
# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
# Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
then
# stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
# so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
then
# stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
# therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
fi
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
}
rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation
|
Record attempts to alter time through settimeofdayruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be
used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple
system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is
not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
Rationale:Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes
to the system time should be audited. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 5.2.4, Req-10.4.2.b, 1487, 169 Remediation script:
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {
# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
# Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
then
# stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
# so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
then
# stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
# therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
fi
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
}
rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation
|
Record Attempts to Alter Time Through stimeruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -k audit_time_rules
Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit
lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected
to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule
form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). If the
auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to
read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S stime -k audit_time_rules
Since the 64 bit version of the "stime" system call is not defined in the audit
lookup table, the corresponding "-F arch=b64" form of this rule is not expected
to be defined on 64 bit systems (the aforementioned "-F arch=b32" stime rule
form itself is sufficient for both 32 bit and 64 bit systems). The -k option
allows for the specification of a key in string form that can be used for
better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport. Multiple system
calls can be defined on the same line to save space if desired, but is not
required. See an example of multiple combined system calls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
Rationale:Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes
to the system time should be audited. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, Req-10.4.2.b, 1487, 169 Remediation script:
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
function rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation {
# Perform the remediation for the 'adjtimex', 'settimeofday', and 'stime' audit
# system calls on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 or Fedora OSes
#
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -k *"
# Create expected audit group and audit rule form for particular system call & architecture
if [ ${ARCH} = "b32" ]
then
# stime system call is known at 32-bit arch (see e.g "$ ausyscall i386 stime" 's output)
# so append it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\|stime\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S stime -k audit_time_rules"
elif [ ${ARCH} = "b64" ]
then
# stime system call isn't known at 64-bit arch (see "$ ausyscall x86_64 stime" 's output)
# therefore don't add it to the list of time group system calls to be audited
GROUP="\(adjtimex\|settimeofday\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules"
fi
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
}
rhel7_fedora_perform_audit_adjtimex_settimeofday_stime_remediation
|
Record Attempts to Alter Time Through clock_settimeruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can
be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport.
Multiple system calls can be defined on the same line to save space if
desired, but is not required. See an example of multiple combined syscalls:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -k audit_time_rules
Rationale:Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes
to the system time should be audited. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 5.2.4, Req-10.4.2.b, 1487, 169 Remediation script:
# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S clock_settime -F a0=.* \(-F key=\|-k \).*"
GROUP="clock_settime"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -k time-change"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Attempts to Alter the localtime FileruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default),
add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory
/etc/audit/rules.d :
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules
The -k option allows for the specification of a key in string form that can
be used for better reporting capability through ausearch and aureport and
should always be used.
Rationale:Arbitrary changes to the system time can be used to obfuscate
nefarious activities in log files, as well as to confuse network services that
are highly dependent upon an accurate system time (such as sshd). All changes
to the system time should be audited. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(b), IR-5, 5.2.4, Req-10.4.2.b, 1487, 169 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/localtime" "wa" "audit_time_rules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/localtime" "wa" "audit_time_rules"
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access ControlsgroupAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be
present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for
auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system
calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while
still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls
could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient.
Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the
arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
|
contains 13 rules |
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmodruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to
use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup
(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in
the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chmod"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chownruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to
use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup
(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in
the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chown"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to
use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup
(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in
the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chmod"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodatruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to
use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup
(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in
the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chmod"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chown"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownatruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chown"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchownruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="chown"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattrruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file permission
changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
warning
Note that these rules can be configured in a
number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls
have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system
calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to
gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications
can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and
unauthorized users. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.5.5, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="xattr"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=${ARCH} -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Record Events that Modify User/Group InformationruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d , in order to capture events that modify
account changes:
-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify
account changes:
-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches
will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected
users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy. identifiers:
references:
AC-2(4), AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 18, 172, 1403, 2130, RHEL-07-030710, Req-10.2.5, 5.2.5, SRG–OS–000004–GPOS–00004, SRG–OS–000239–GPOS–00089, SRG–OS–000241–GPOS–00090, SRG–OS–000241–GPOS–00091, SRG–OS–000303–GPOS–00120, SRG–OS–000476–GPOS–00221 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/group" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/group" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/passwd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/passwd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/gshadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/gshadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/shadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/shadow" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/security/opasswd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/security/opasswd" "wa" "audit_rules_usergroup_modification"
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Network EnvironmentruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d , setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification
Rationale:The network environment should not be modified by anything other
than administrator action. Any change to network parameters should be
audited. Remediation script:
# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -k *"
# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
GROUP="set\(host\|domain\)name"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
# Then perform the remediations for the watch rules
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/issue" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/issue" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/issue.net" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/issue.net" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/hosts" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/hosts" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/sysconfig/network" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/sysconfig/network" "wa" "audit_rules_networkconfig_modification"
|
System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissiverule
If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root
group account, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command:
$ sudo chmod 0640 audit_file
Otherwise, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command:
$ sudo chmod 0600 audit_file
Rationale:
If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed.
Remediation script:
if `grep -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf` ; then
GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then
chmod 0640 /var/log/audit/audit.log
chmod 0440 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
else
chmod 0600 /var/log/audit/audit.log
chmod 0400 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
fi
chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*
chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*
else
chmod 0600 /var/log/audit/audit.log
chmod 0400 /var/log/audit/audit.log.*
chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*
chmod 0640 /etc/audit/rules.d/*
fi
|
Record Events that Modify the System's Mandatory Access ControlsruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy
Rationale:The system's mandatory access policy (SELinux) should not be
arbitrarily changed by anything other than administrator action. All changes to
MAC policy should be audited. Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/selinux/" "wa" "MAC-policy"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/selinux/" "wa" "MAC-policy"
|
Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout EventsruleThe audit system already collects login information for all users
and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual
edits of files involved in storing logon events:
-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins
-w /var/run/faillock/ -p wa -k logins
-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for unattempted manual
edits of files involved in storing logon events:
-w /var/log/tallylog -p wa -k logins
-w /var/run/faillock/ -p wa -k logins
-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins
Rationale:Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such
as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 172, 2884, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000473-GPOS-00218, RHEL-07-030490, Req-10.2.3, 5.2.8 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/tallylog" "wa" "logins"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/tallylog" "wa" "logins"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/run/faillock/" "wa" "logins"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/run/faillock/" "wa" "logins"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/lastlog" "wa" "logins"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/lastlog" "wa" "logins"
|
Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation InformationruleThe audit system already collects process information for all
users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual
edits of files involved in storing such process information:
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for attempted manual
edits of files involved in storing such process information:
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
Rationale:Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such
as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion. Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/run/utmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/run/utmp" "wa" "session"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/btmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/btmp" "wa" "session"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/var/log/wtmp" "wa" "session"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/var/log/wtmp" "wa" "session"
|
Ensure auditd Collects Unauthorized Access Attempts to Files (unsuccessful)ruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect unauthorized file
accesses for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured
to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon
startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix
.rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d :
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following lines:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access
Rationale:Unsuccessful attempts to access files could be an indicator of malicious activity on a system. Auditing
these events could serve as evidence of potential system compromise. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 172, 2884, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000461-GPOS-00205, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, RHEL-07-030420, Req-10.2.4, Req-10.2.1, 5.2.10 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
# First fix the -EACCES requirement
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
GROUP="\(creat\|open\|truncate\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
# Then fix the -EPERM requirement
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
# No need to change content of $GROUP variable - it's the same as for -EACCES case above
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S creat -S open -S openat -S open_by_handle_at -S truncate -S ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k access"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Ensure auditd Collects Information on the Use of Privileged CommandsruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect the execution of
privileged commands for all users and root. To find the relevant setuid /
setgid programs, run the following command for each local partition
PART:
$ sudo find PART -xdev -type f -perm -4000 -o -type f -perm -2000 2>/dev/null
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules
program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add a line of
the following form to a file with suffix .rules in the directory
/etc/audit/rules.d for each setuid / setgid program on the system,
replacing the SETUID_PROG_PATH part with the full path of that setuid /
setgid program in the list:
-a always,exit -F path=SETUID_PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add a line of the following
form to /etc/audit/audit.rules for each setuid / setgid program on the
system, replacing the SETUID_PROG_PATH part with the full path of that
setuid / setgid program in the list:
-a always,exit -F path=SETUID_PROG_PATH -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged
Rationale:Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by
authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts,
is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations.
Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and identify
the risk from insider and advanced persistent threast.
Privileged programs are subject to escalation-of-privilege attacks,
which attempt to subvert their normal role of providing some necessary but
limited capability. As such, motivation exists to monitor these programs for
unusual activity.
identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-2(4), AU-6(9), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 2234, SRG-OS-000327-GPOS-00127, RHEL-07-030310, Req-10.2.2, 5.2.10, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation {
#
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local min_auid="$2"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation 'auditctl | augenrules' '500 | 1000'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
declare -a files_to_inspect=()
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then:
# * add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'to the list of files to be inspected,
# * specify '/etc/audit/audit.rules' as the output audit file, where
# missing rules should be inserted
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("/etc/audit/audit.rules")
output_audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
#
# If the audit tool is 'augenrules', then:
# * add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list of files to be inspected
# (split by newline),
# * specify /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules' as the output file, where
# missing rules should be inserted
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
IFS=$'\n' files_to_inspect=($(find /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name *.rules -print))
output_audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules"
fi
# Obtain the list of SUID/SGID binaries on the particular system (split by newline)
# into privileged_binaries array
IFS=$'\n' privileged_binaries=($(find / -xdev -type f -perm -4000 -o -type f -perm -2000 2>/dev/null))
# Keep list of SUID/SGID binaries that have been already handled within some previous iteration
declare -a sbinaries_to_skip=()
# For each found sbinary in privileged_binaries list
for sbinary in "${privileged_binaries[@]}"
do
# Replace possible slash '/' character in sbinary definition so we could use it in sed expressions below
sbinary_esc=${sbinary//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Check if this sbinary wasn't already handled in some of the previous iterations
# Return match only if whole sbinary definition matched (not in the case just prefix matched!!!)
if [[ $(sed -ne "/${sbinary_esc}$/p" <<< ${sbinaries_to_skip[@]}) ]]
then
# If so, don't process it second time & go to process next sbinary
continue
fi
# Reset the counter of inspected files when starting to check
# presence of existing audit rule for new sbinary
local count_of_inspected_files=0
# For each audit rules file from the list of files to be inspected
for afile in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Search current audit rules file's content for match. Match criteria:
# * existing rule is for the same SUID/SGID binary we are currently processing (but
# can contain multiple -F path= elements covering multiple SUID/SGID binaries)
# * existing rule contains all arguments from expected rule form (though can contain
# them in arbitrary order)
base_search=$(sed -e "/-a always,exit/!d" -e "/-F path=${sbinary_esc}$/!d" \
-e "/-F path=[^[:space:]]\+/!d" -e "/-F perm=.*/!d" \
-e "/-F auid>=${min_auid}/!d" -e "/-F auid!=4294967295/!d" \
-e "/-k privileged/!d" $afile)
# Increase the count of inspected files for this sbinary
count_of_inspected_files=$((count_of_inspected_files + 1))
# Define expected rule form for this binary
expected_rule="-a always,exit -F path=${sbinary} -F perm=x -F auid>=${min_auid} -F auid!=4294967295 -k privileged"
# Require execute access type to be set for existing audit rule
exec_access='x'
# Search current audit rules file's content for presence of rule pattern for this sbinary
if [[ $base_search ]]
then
# Current audit rules file already contains rule for this binary =>
# Store the exact form of found rule for this binary for further processing
concrete_rule=$base_search
# Select all other SUID/SGID binaries possibly also present in the found rule
IFS=$'\n' handled_sbinaries=($(grep -o -e "-F path=[^[:space:]]\+" <<< $concrete_rule))
IFS=$' ' handled_sbinaries=(${handled_sbinaries[@]//-F path=/})
# Merge the list of such SUID/SGID binaries found in this iteration with global list ignoring duplicates
sbinaries_to_skip=($(for i in "${sbinaries_to_skip[@]}" "${handled_sbinaries[@]}"; do echo $i; done | sort -du))
# Separate concrete_rule into three sections using hash '#'
# sign as a delimiter around rule's permission section borders
concrete_rule=$(echo $concrete_rule | sed -n "s/\(.*\)\+\(-F perm=[rwax]\+\)\+/\1#\2#/p")
# Split concrete_rule into head, perm, and tail sections using hash '#' delimiter
IFS=$'#' read rule_head rule_perm rule_tail <<< "$concrete_rule"
# Extract already present exact access type [r|w|x|a] from rule's permission section
access_type=${rule_perm//-F perm=/}
# Verify current permission access type(s) for rule contain 'x' (execute) permission
if ! grep -q "$exec_access" <<< "$access_type"
then
# If not, append the 'x' (execute) permission to the existing access type bits
access_type="$access_type$exec_access"
# Reconstruct the permissions section for the rule
new_rule_perm="-F perm=$access_type"
# Update existing rule in current audit rules file with the new permission section
sed -i "s#${rule_head}\(.*\)${rule_tail}#${rule_head}${new_rule_perm}${rule_tail}#" $afile
fi
# If the required audit rule for particular sbinary wasn't found yet, insert it under following conditions:
#
# * in the "auditctl" mode of operation insert particular rule each time
# (because in this mode there's only one file -- /etc/audit/audit.rules to be inspected for presence of this rule),
#
# * in the "augenrules" mode of operation insert particular rule only once and only in case we have already
# searched all of the files from /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules location (since that audit rule can be defined
# in any of those files and if not, we want it to be inserted only once into /etc/audit/rules.d/privileged.rules file)
#
elif [ "$tool" == "auditctl" ] || [[ "$tool" == "augenrules" && $count_of_inspected_files -eq "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" ]]
then
# Current audit rules file's content doesn't contain expected rule for this
# SUID/SGID binary yet => append it
echo $expected_rule >> $output_audit_file
fi
done
done
}
perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation "auditctl" "1000"
perform_audit_rules_privileged_commands_remediation "augenrules" "1000"
|
Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful)ruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect media exportation
events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to
use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup
(the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in
the directory /etc/audit/rules.d , setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export
Rationale:The unauthorized exportation of data to external media could result in an information leak
where classified information, Privacy Act information, and intellectual property could be lost. An audit
trail should be created each time a filesystem is mounted to help identify and guard against information
loss. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-3(1), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 135, 2884, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, RHEL-07-030530, Req-10.2.7, 5.2.13, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
GROUP="mount"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k export"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Ensure auditd Collects File Deletion Events by UserruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect file deletion events
for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d , setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as
appropriate for your system:
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete
Rationale:Auditing file deletions will create an audit trail for files that are removed
from the system. The audit trail could aid in system troubleshooting, as well as, detecting
malicious processes that attempt to delete log files to conceal their presence. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 366, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-07-030750, Req-10.2.7, 5.2.14 Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k *"
# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
GROUP="\(rmdir\|unlink\|rename\)"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S renameat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
|
Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator ActionsruleAt a minimum the audit system should collect administrator actions
for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default),
add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory
/etc/audit/rules.d :
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file:
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
Rationale:The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record
of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes. identifiers:
references:
AC-2(7)(b), AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 126, Req-10.2.2, Req-10.2.5.b, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/etc/sudoers" "wa" "actions"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/etc/sudoers" "wa" "actions"
|
Ensure auditd Collects Information on Kernel Module Loading and UnloadingruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program
to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file
with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d to capture kernel module
loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system:
-w /usr/sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit
rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file
in order to capture kernel module loading and unloading events, setting ARCH to either b32 or
b64 as appropriate for your system:
-w /usr/sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
-w /usr/sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules
Rationale:The addition/removal of kernel modules can be used to alter the behavior of
the kernel and potentially introduce malicious code into kernel space. It is important
to have an audit trail of modules that have been introduced into the kernel. identifiers:
references:
AC-17(7), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-12(a), AU-12(c), IR-5, 172, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00216, SRG-OS-000477, GPOS-00222, RHEL-07-030670, Req-10.2.7, 5.2.17 Remediation script:
# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
# Note: 32-bit kernel modules can't be loaded / unloaded on 64-bit kernel =>
# it's not required on a 64-bit system to check also for the presence
# of 32-bit's equivalent of the corresponding rule. Therefore for
# each system it's enought to check presence of system's native rule form.
[ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b64")
for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
PATTERN="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S .* -k *"
# Use escaped BRE regex to specify rule group
GROUP="\(init\|delete\)_module"
FULL_RULE="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules"
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_syscall_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local group="$3"
local arch="$4"
local full_rule="$5"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "5" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_syscall_rule 'tool' 'pattern' 'group' 'arch' 'full rule'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
declare -a files_to_inspect
# First check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules' )
# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Extract audit $key from audit rule so we can use it later
key=$(expr "$full_rule" : '.*-k[[:space:]]\([^[:space:]]\+\)')
# Check if particular audit rule is already defined
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(sed -s -n -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d;F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "${match}")
done
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
#
# Indicator that we want to append $full_rule into $audit_file by default
local append_expected_rule=0
for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that:
# * follow the rule pattern, and
# * meet the hardware architecture requirement, and
# * are current syscall group specific
IFS=$'\n' existing_rules=($(sed -e "/${pattern}/!d" -e "/${arch}/!d" -e "/${group}/!d" "$audit_file"))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Process rules found case-by-case
for rule in "${existing_rules[@]}"
do
# Found rule is for same arch & key, but differs (e.g. in count of -S arguments)
if [ "${rule}" != "${full_rule}" ]
then
# If so, isolate just '(-S \w)+' substring of that rule
rule_syscalls=$(echo $rule | grep -o -P '(-S \w+ )+')
# Check if list of '-S syscall' arguments of that rule is subset
# of '-S syscall' list of expected $full_rule
if grep -q -- "$rule_syscalls" <<< "$full_rule"
then
# Rule is covered (i.e. the list of -S syscalls for this rule is
# subset of -S syscalls of $full_rule => existing rule can be deleted
# Thus delete the rule from audit.rules & our array
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
existing_rules=("${existing_rules[@]//$rule/}")
else
# Rule isn't covered by $full_rule - it besides -S syscall arguments
# for this group contains also -S syscall arguments for other syscall
# group. Example: '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' => group='chown'
# since 'lchown' & 'fchownat' share 'chown' substring
# Therefore:
# * 1) delete the original rule from audit.rules
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' rule would be deleted)
# * 2) delete the -S syscall arguments for this syscall group, but
# keep those not belonging to this syscall group
# (original '-S lchown -S fchmod -S fchownat' would become '-S fchmod'
# * 3) append the modified (filtered) rule again into audit.rules
# if the same rule not already present
#
# 1) Delete the original rule
sed -i -e "/$rule/d" "$audit_file"
# 2) Delete syscalls for this group, but keep those from other groups
# Convert current rule syscall's string into array splitting by '-S' delimiter
IFS=$'-S' read -a rule_syscalls_as_array <<< "$rule_syscalls"
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# Declare new empty string to hold '-S syscall' arguments from other groups
new_syscalls_for_rule=''
# Walk through existing '-S syscall' arguments
for syscall_arg in "${rule_syscalls_as_array[@]}"
do
# Skip empty $syscall_arg values
if [ "$syscall_arg" == '' ]
then
continue
fi
# If the '-S syscall' doesn't belong to current group add it to the new list
# (together with adding '-S' delimiter back for each of such item found)
if grep -q -v -- "$group" <<< "$syscall_arg"
then
new_syscalls_for_rule="$new_syscalls_for_rule -S $syscall_arg"
fi
done
# Replace original '-S syscall' list with the new one for this rule
updated_rule=${rule//$rule_syscalls/$new_syscalls_for_rule}
# Squeeze repeated whitespace characters in rule definition (if any) into one
updated_rule=$(echo "$updated_rule" | tr -s '[:space:]')
# 3) Append the modified / filtered rule again into audit.rules
# (but only in case it's not present yet to prevent duplicate definitions)
if ! grep -q -- "$updated_rule" "$audit_file"
then
echo "$updated_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
fi
else
# $audit_file already contains the expected rule form for this
# architecture & key => don't insert it second time
append_expected_rule=1
fi
done
# We deleted all rules that were subset of the expected one for this arch & key.
# Also isolated rules containing system calls not from this system calls group.
# Now append the expected rule if it's not present in $audit_file yet
if [[ ${append_expected_rule} -eq "0" ]]
then
echo "$full_rule" >> "$audit_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_syscall_rule "auditctl" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
fix_audit_syscall_rule "augenrules" "$PATTERN" "$GROUP" "$ARCH" "$FULL_RULE"
done
# Then perform the remediations for the watch rules
# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/insmod" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/insmod" "x" "modules"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/rmmod" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/rmmod" "x" "modules"
function fix_audit_watch_rule {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local tool="$1"
local path="$2"
local required_access_bits="$3"
local key="$4"
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "4" ]
then
echo "Usage: fix_audit_watch_rule 'tool' 'path' 'bits' 'key'"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined | Audit rules file to inspect |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# auditctl | Doesn't matter | /etc/audit/audit.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# augenrules | Yes | /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules |
# augenrules | No | /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
declare -a files_to_inspect
# Check sanity of the specified audit tool
if [ "$tool" != 'auditctl' ] && [ "$tool" != 'augenrules' ]
then
echo "Unknown audit rules loading tool: $1. Aborting."
echo "Use either 'auditctl' or 'augenrules'!"
exit 1
# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
elif [ "$tool" == 'auditctl' ]
then
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" '/etc/audit/audit.rules')
# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to list of files for inspection.
elif [ "$tool" == 'augenrules' ]
then
# Case when particular audit rule is already defined in some of /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules file
# Get pair -- filepath : matching_row into @matches array
IFS=$'\n' matches=($(grep -P "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules))
# Reset IFS back to default
unset $IFS
# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
# Extract filepath from the match
rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
# Append that path into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect=("${files_to_inspect[@]}" "$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
# Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' into list of files for inspection
files_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules"
# If the $key.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
if [ ! -e "$files_to_inspect" ]
then
touch "$files_to_inspect"
chmod 0640 "$files_to_inspect"
fi
fi
fi
# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
# Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
if grep -q -P -- "[\s]*-w[\s]+$path" "$audit_rules_file"
then
# Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
# all of the required access type bits
# Escape slashes in path for use in sed pattern below
local esc_path=${path//$'/'/$'\/'}
# Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
local sp="[[:space:]]"
# Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s/$sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*/\1/p" "$audit_rules_file")
# Split required access bits string into characters array
# (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
for access_bit in $(echo "$required_access_bits" | grep -o .)
do
# For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
# if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
# If not, append that bit at the end
if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
then
# Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
fi
done
# Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
# ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
sed -i "s/\($sp*-w$sp\+$esc_path$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)/\1$current_access_bits\3/" "$audit_rules_file"
else
# Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
# with proper key
echo "-w $path -p $required_access_bits -k $key" >> "$audit_rules_file"
fi
done
}
fix_audit_watch_rule "auditctl" "/usr/sbin/modprobe" "x" "modules"
fix_audit_watch_rule "augenrules" "/usr/sbin/modprobe" "x" "modules"
|
Make the auditd Configuration ImmutableruleIf the auditd daemon is configured to use the
augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the
default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the
directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to make the auditd configuration
immutable:
-e 2
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl
utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to
/etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to make the auditd configuration
immutable:
-e 2
With this setting, a reboot will be required to change any audit rules.
Rationale:Making the audit configuration immutable prevents accidental as
well as malicious modification of the audit rules, although it may be
problematic if legitimate changes are needed during system
operation Remediation script:
# Traverse all of:
#
# /etc/audit/audit.rules, (for auditctl case)
# /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules (for augenrules case)
#
# files to check if '-e .*' setting is present in that '*.rules' file already.
# If found, delete such occurrence since auditctl(8) manual page instructs the
# '-e 2' rule should be placed as the last rule in the configuration
find /etc/audit /etc/audit/rules.d -maxdepth 1 -type f -name *.rules -exec sed -i '/-e[[:space:]]\+.*/d' {} ';'
# Append '-e 2' requirement at the end of both:
# * /etc/audit/audit.rules file (for auditctl case)
# * /etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules (for augenrules case)
for AUDIT_FILE in "/etc/audit/audit.rules" "/etc/audit/rules.d/immutable.rules"
do
echo '' >> $AUDIT_FILE
echo '# Set the audit.rules configuration immutable per security requirements' >> $AUDIT_FILE
echo '# Reboot is required to change audit rules once this setting is applied' >> $AUDIT_FILE
echo '-e 2' >> $AUDIT_FILE
done
|
Enable auditd ServiceruleThe auditd service is an essential userspace component of
the Linux Auditing System, as it is responsible for writing audit records to
disk.
The auditd service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable auditd.service
Rationale:Without establishing what type of events occurred, it would be difficult
to establish, correlate, and investigate the events leading up to an outage or attack.
Ensuring the auditd service is active ensures audit records
generated by the kernel are appropriately recorded.
identifiers:
references:
AU-3, AC-17(1), AU-1(b), AU-10, AU-12(a), AU-12(c), AU-14(1), IR-5, 126, 131, SRG-OS-000038-GPOS-00016, SRG-OS-000039-GPOS-00017, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00021, SRG-OS-000254-GPOS-00095, SRG-OS-000255-GPOS-00096, RHEL-07-030010, Req-10, 5.2.2, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
function service_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
echo
echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
echo "as the last argument"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
service_util="/sbin/service"
chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi
# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
service_state="enable"
service_operation="start"
chkconfig_state="on"
else
service_state="disable"
service_operation="stop"
chkconfig_state="off"
fi
# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
$service_util $service $service_operation
$chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
$service_util $service_operation $service
$service_util $service_state $service
fi
# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \
if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
else
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
fi
fi
}
service_command enable auditd.service
|
Enable Auditing for Processes Which Start Prior to the Audit DaemonruleTo ensure all processes can be audited, even those which start
prior to the audit daemon, add the argument audit=1 to the default
GRUB 2 command line for the Linux operating system in
/etc/default/grub , in the manner below:
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="crashkernel=auto rd.lvm.lv=VolGroup/LogVol06 rd.lvm.lv=VolGroup/lv_swap rhgb quiet rd.shell=0 audit=1"
warning
The GRUB 2 configuration file, grub.cfg ,
is automatically updated each time a new kernel is installed. Note that any
changes to /etc/default/grub require rebuilding the grub.cfg
file. To update the GRUB 2 configuration file manually, use the
grub2-mkconfig -o command as follows:
Rationale:
Each process on the system carries an "auditable" flag which indicates whether
its activities can be audited. Although auditd takes care of enabling
this for all processes which launch after it does, adding the kernel argument
ensures it is set for every process during boot.
identifiers:
references:
AC-17(1), AU-14(1), AU-1(b), AU-2(a), AU-2(c), AU-2(d), AU-10, IR-5, 1464, 130, Req-10.3, 5.2.3 Remediation script:
# Correct the form of default kernel command line in /etc/default/grub
grep -q ^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\".*audit=0.*\" /etc/default/grub && \
sed -i "s/audit=[^[:space:]\+]/audit=1/g" /etc/default/grub
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
sed -i "s/\(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=\)\"\(.*\)\"/\1\"\2 audit=1\"/" /etc/default/grub
fi
# Correct the form of kernel command line for each installed kernel
# in the bootloader
/sbin/grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args="audit=1"
|
Servicesgroup
The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review
the software which Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It
then enumerates the software packages installed on a default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 system and provides guidance about which
ones can be safely disabled.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 provides a convenient minimal install option that essentially installs the bare necessities for a functional
system. When building Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 servers, it is highly recommended to select the minimal packages and then build up
the system from there.
|
contains 32 rules |
Obsolete ServicesgroupThis section discusses a number of network-visible
services which have historically caused problems for system
security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service
has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of
this, many of these services are not installed as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
by default.
Organizations which are running these services should
switch to more secure equivalents as soon as possible.
If it remains absolutely necessary to run one of
these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict
the service as much as possible, for instance by configuring host
firewall software such as firewalld to restrict access to the
vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known
need to use it. |
contains 16 rules |
XinetdgroupThe xinetd service acts as a dedicated listener for some
network services (mostly, obsolete ones) and can be used to provide access
controls and perform some logging. It has been largely obsoleted by other
features, and it is not installed by default. The older Inetd service
is not even available as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. |
contains 2 rules |
Disable xinetd Servicerule
The xinetd service can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable xinetd.service
Rationale:
The xinetd service provides a dedicated listener service for some programs,
which is no longer necessary for commonly-used network services. Disabling
it ensures that these uncommon services are not running, and also prevents
attacks against xinetd itself.
Remediation script:#
# Disable xinetd.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable xinetd.service
#
# Stop xinetd.service if currently running
#
systemctl stop xinetd.service
|
Uninstall xinetd PackageruleThe xinetd package can be uninstalled with the following command:
$ sudo yum erase xinetd
Rationale:
Removing the xinetd package decreases the risk of the
xinetd service's accidental (or intentional) activation.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove xinetd
|
TelnetgroupThe telnet protocol does not provide confidentiality or integrity
for information transmitted on the network. This includes authentication
information such as passwords. Organizations which use telnet should be
actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol. |
contains 3 rules |
Disable telnet Servicerule
The telnet service configuration file /etc/xinetd.d/telnet
is not created automatically. If it was created manually, check the
/etc/xinetd.d/telnet file and ensure that disable = no
is changed to read disable = yes as follows below:
# description: The telnet server serves telnet sessions; it uses \\
# unencrypted username/password pairs for authentication.
service telnet
{
flags = REUSE
socket_type = stream
wait = no
user = root
server = /usr/sbin/in.telnetd
log_on_failure += USERID
disable = yes
}
If the /etc/xinetd.d/telnet file does not exist, make sure that
the activation of the telnet service on system boot is disabled
via the following command:
The rexec socket can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable rexec.socket
Rationale:
The telnet protocol uses unencrypted network communication, which
means that data from the login session, including passwords and
all other information transmitted during the session, can be
stolen by eavesdroppers on the network. The telnet protocol is also
subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Remediation script:grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/telnet && \
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/telnet
#
# Disable telnet.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable telnet.socket
#
# Stop telnet.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop telnet.socket
|
Uninstall telnet-server PackageruleThe telnet-server package can be uninstalled with
the following command:
$ sudo yum erase telnet-server Rationale:
It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding
requirements or mission objectives. These unnecessary capabilities are often overlooked and therefore
may remain unsecure. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors.
The telnet service provides an unencrypted remote access service which does not provide for the
confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. If a privileged user were
to login using this service, the privileged user password could be compromised.
Removing the telnet-server package decreases the risk of the telnet service's accidental
(or intentional) activation.
Remediation script:if rpm -qa | grep -q telnet-server; then
yum -y remove telnet-server
fi
|
Remove telnet ClientsruleThe telnet client allows users to start connections to other
systems via the telnet protocol. Rationale:The telnet protocol is insecure and unencrypted. The use
of an unencrypted transmission medium could allow an unauthorized user
to steal credentials. The ssh package provides an
encrypted session and stronger security and is included in Red Hat
Enterprise Linux. identifiers:
references:
2.1.2 Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove telnet
|
Rlogin, Rsh, and RexecgroupThe Berkeley r-commands are legacy services which
allow cleartext remote access and have an insecure trust
model. |
contains 6 rules |
Uninstall rsh-server PackageruleThe rsh-server package can be uninstalled with
the following command:
$ sudo yum erase rsh-server
Rationale:The rsh-server service provides unencrypted remote access service which does not
provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session and has very weak
authentication. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password
could be compromised. The rsh-server package provides several obsolete and insecure
network services. Removing it decreases the risk of those services' accidental (or intentional)
activation.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove rsh-server
|
Disable rexec ServiceruleThe rexec service, which is available with
the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately
as a systemd socket, should be disabled.
If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rexec .
If using systemd,
The rexec socket can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable rexec.socket
Rationale:The rexec service uses unencrypted network communications, which
means that data from the login session, including passwords and
all other information transmitted during the session, can be
stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.
Remediation script:grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rexec && \
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rexec
#
# Disable rexec.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rexec.socket
#
# Stop rexec.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rexec.socket
|
Disable rsh ServiceruleThe rsh service, which is available with
the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately
as a systemd socket, should be disabled.
If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rsh .
If using systemd,
The rsh socket can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable rsh.socket
Rationale:The rsh service uses unencrypted network communications, which
means that data from the login session, including passwords and
all other information transmitted during the session, can be
stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.
Remediation script:grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rsh && \
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rsh
#
# Disable rsh.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rsh.socket
#
# Stop rsh.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rsh.socket
|
Uninstall rsh PackageruleThe rsh package contains the client commands
for the rsh services Rationale:These legacy clients contain numerous security exposures and have
been replaced with the more secure SSH package. Even if the server is removed,
it is best to ensure the clients are also removed to prevent users from
inadvertently attempting to use these commands and therefore exposing
their credentials. Note that removing the rsh package removes
the clients for rsh ,rcp , and rlogin .
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove rsh
|
Disable rlogin ServiceruleThe rlogin service, which is available with
the rsh-server package and runs as a service through xinetd or separately
as a systemd socket, should be disabled.
If using xinetd, set disable to yes in /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin .
If using systemd,
The rlogin socket can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable rlogin.socket
Rationale:The rlogin service uses unencrypted network communications, which
means that data from the login session, including passwords and
all other information transmitted during the session, can be
stolen by eavesdroppers on the network.
Remediation script:grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin && \
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/rlogin
#
# Disable rlogin.socket for all systemd targets
#
systemctl disable rlogin.socket
#
# Stop rlogin.socket if currently running
#
systemctl stop rlogin.socket
|
Remove Rsh Trust FilesruleThe files /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts (in
each user's home directory) list remote hosts and users that are trusted by the
local system when using the rshd daemon.
To remove these files, run the following command to delete them from any
location:
$ sudo rm /etc/hosts.equiv
$ rm ~/.rhosts
Rationale:Trust files are convenient, but when
used in conjunction with the R-services, they can allow
unauthenticated access to a system. Remediation script:find -type f -name .rhosts -exec rm -f '{}' \;
rm /etc/hosts.equiv
|
NISgroupThe Network Information Service (NIS), also known as 'Yellow
Pages' (YP), and its successor NIS+ have been made obsolete by
Kerberos, LDAP, and other modern centralized authentication
services. NIS should not be used because it suffers from security
problems inherent in its design, such as inadequate protection of
important authentication information. |
contains 3 rules |
Uninstall ypserv PackageruleThe ypserv package can be uninstalled with
the following command:
$ sudo yum erase ypserv
Rationale:The NIS service provides an unencrypted authentication service which does not
provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session.
Removing the ypserv package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional)
activation of NIS or NIS+ services.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove ypserv
|
Disable ypbind ServiceruleThe ypbind service, which allows the system to act as a client in
a NIS or NIS+ domain, should be disabled.
The ypbind service can be disabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl disable ypbind.service
Rationale:
Disabling the ypbind service ensures the system is not acting
as a client in a NIS or NIS+ domain.
Remediation script:
function service_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
echo
echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
echo "as the last argument"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
service_util="/sbin/service"
chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi
# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
service_state="enable"
service_operation="start"
chkconfig_state="on"
else
service_state="disable"
service_operation="stop"
chkconfig_state="off"
fi
# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
$service_util $service $service_operation
$chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
$service_util $service_operation $service
$service_util $service_state $service
fi
# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \
if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
else
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
fi
fi
}
service_command disable ypbind.service
|
Remove NIS ClientruleThe Network Information Service (NIS), formerly known as Yellow Pages,
is a client-server directory service protocol used to distribute system configuration
files. The NIS client (ypbind ) was used to bind a machine to an NIS server
and receive the distributed configuration files. Rationale:The NIS service is inherently an insecure system that has been vulnerable
to DOS attacks, buffer overflows and has poor authentication for querying NIS maps.
NIS generally has been replaced by such protocols as Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP). It is recommended that the service be removed. identifiers:
references:
2.1.5 Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove ypbind
|
Chat/Messaging Servicesgroup
The talk software makes it possible for users to send and receive messages
across systems through a terminal session.
|
contains 2 rules |
Uninstall talk-server Packagerule
The talk-server package can be removed with the following command:
$ sudo yum erase talk-server
Rationale:
The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols
for communications. Removing the talk-server package decreases the
risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk services.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove talk-server
|
Uninstall talk PackageruleThe talk package contains the client program for the
Internet talk protocol, which allows the user to chat with other users on
different systems. Talk is a communication program which copies lines from one
terminal to the terminal of another user.
The talk package can be removed with the following command:
$ sudo yum erase talk
Rationale:
The talk software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols
for communications. Removing the talk package decreases the
risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of talk client program.
Remediation script:
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command remove talk
|
Cron and At DaemonsgroupThe cron and at services are used to allow commands to
be executed at a later time. The cron service is required by almost
all systems to perform necessary maintenance tasks, while at may or
may not be required on a given system. Both daemons should be
configured defensively. |
contains 1 rule |
Enable cron ServiceruleThe crond service is used to execute commands at
preconfigured times. It is required by almost all systems to perform necessary
maintenance tasks, such as notifying root of system activity.
The crond service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable crond.service
Rationale:Due to its usage for maintenance and security-supporting tasks,
enabling the cron daemon is essential.
Remediation script:#
# Enable crond.service for all systemd targets
#
systemctl enable crond.service
#
# Start crond.service if not currently running
#
systemctl start crond.service
|
SSH ServergroupThe SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and
remote file transfer. SSH provides confidentiality and integrity
for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server
authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The
implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more
detailed documentation is available from its website,
http://www.openssh.org. Its server program is called sshd and
provided by the RPM package openssh-server . |
contains 12 rules |
Configure OpenSSH Server if NecessarygroupIf the system needs to act as an SSH server, then
certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon configuration
file /etc/ssh/sshd_config . The following recommendations can be
applied to this file. See the sshd_config(5) man page for more
detailed information. |
contains 10 rules |
Allow Only SSH Protocol 2ruleOnly SSH protocol version 2 connections should be
permitted. The default setting in
/etc/ssh/sshd_config is correct, and can be
verified by ensuring that the following
line appears:
Protocol 2
Rationale:
SSH protocol version 1 is an insecure implementation of the SSH protocol and
has many well-known vulnerability exploits. Exploits of the SSH daemon could provide
immediate root access to the system.
Remediation script:grep -qi ^Protocol /etc/ssh/sshd_config && \
sed -i "s/Protocol.*/Protocol 2/gI" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Protocol 2" >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
|
Set SSH Idle Timeout IntervalruleSSH allows administrators to set an idle timeout
interval.
After this interval has passed, the idle user will be
automatically logged out.
To set an idle timeout interval, edit the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config as
follows:
ClientAliveInterval interval
The timeout interval is given in seconds. To have a timeout
of 10 minutes, set interval to 600.
If a shorter timeout has already been set for the login
shell, that value will preempt any SSH
setting made here. Keep in mind that some processes may stop SSH
from correctly detecting that the user is idle.
Rationale:
Terminating an idle ssh session within a short time period reduces the window of
opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session
enabled on the console or console port that has been let unattended.
identifiers:
references:
AC-2(5), SA-8(i), AC-12, 1133, 2361, SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072, SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109, RHEL-07-040190, Req-8.1.8, 6.2.12, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
sshd_idle_timeout_value="300"
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^ClientAliveInterval' $sshd_idle_timeout_value 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Set SSH Client Alive CountruleTo ensure the SSH idle timeout occurs precisely when the ClientAliveCountMax is set,
edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config as
follows:
ClientAliveCountMax 0
Rationale:
This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveCountMax
is reached.
Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^ClientAliveCountMax' '0' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Disable SSH Support for .rhosts FilesruleSSH can emulate the behavior of the obsolete rsh
command in allowing users to enable insecure access to their
accounts via .rhosts files.
To ensure this behavior is disabled, add or correct the
following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config :
IgnoreRhosts yes
Rationale:
SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host
can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts.
Remediation script:grep -qi ^IgnoreRhosts /etc/ssh/sshd_config && \
sed -i "s/IgnoreRhosts.*/IgnoreRhosts yes/gI" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "IgnoreRhosts yes" >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
|
Disable Host-Based AuthenticationruleSSH's cryptographic host-based authentication is
more secure than .rhosts authentication. However, it is
not recommended that hosts unilaterally trust one another, even
within an organization.
To disable host-based authentication, add or correct the
following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config :
HostbasedAuthentication no
Rationale:
SSH trust relationships mean a compromise on one host
can allow an attacker to move trivially to other hosts.
Remediation script:grep -q ^HostbasedAuthentication /etc/ssh/sshd_config && \
sed -i "s/HostbasedAuthentication.*/HostbasedAuthentication no/g" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
if ! [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "HostbasedAuthentication no" >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
|
Disable SSH Root LoginruleThe root user should never be allowed to login to a
system directly over a network.
To disable root login via SSH, add or correct the following line
in /etc/ssh/sshd_config :
PermitRootLogin no
Rationale:
Even though the communications channel may be encrypted, an additional layer of
security is gained by extending the policy of not logging directly on as root.
In addition, logging in with a user-specific account provides individual
accountability of actions performed on the system and also helps to minimize
direct attack attempts on root's password.
Remediation script:
SSHD_CONFIG='/etc/ssh/sshd_config'
# Obtain line number of first uncommented case-insensitive occurrence of Match
# block directive (possibly prefixed with whitespace) present in $SSHD_CONFIG
FIRST_MATCH_BLOCK=$(sed -n '/^[[:space:]]*Match[^\n]*/I{=;q}' $SSHD_CONFIG)
# Obtain line number of first uncommented case-insensitive occurence of
# PermitRootLogin directive (possibly prefixed with whitespace) present in
# $SSHD_CONFIG
FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=$(sed -n '/^[[:space:]]*PermitRootLogin[^\n]*/I{=;q}' $SSHD_CONFIG)
# Case: Match block directive not present in $SSHD_CONFIG
if [ -z "$FIRST_MATCH_BLOCK" ]
then
# Case: PermitRootLogin directive not present in $SSHD_CONFIG yet
if [ -z "$FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ]
then
# Append 'PermitRootLogin no' at the end of $SSHD_CONFIG
echo -e "\nPermitRootLogin no" >> $SSHD_CONFIG
# Case: PermitRootLogin directive present in $SSHD_CONFIG already
else
# Replace first uncommented case-insensitive occurrence
# of PermitRootLogin directive
sed -i "$FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN s/^[[:space:]]*PermitRootLogin.*$/PermitRootLogin no/I" $SSHD_CONFIG
fi
# Case: Match block directive present in $SSHD_CONFIG
else
# Case: PermitRootLogin directive not present in $SSHD_CONFIG yet
if [ -z "$FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ]
then
# Prepend 'PermitRootLogin no' before first uncommented
# case-insensitive occurrence of Match block directive
sed -i "$FIRST_MATCH_BLOCK s/^\([[:space:]]*Match[^\n]*\)/PermitRootLogin no\n\1/I" $SSHD_CONFIG
# Case: PermitRootLogin directive present in $SSHD_CONFIG and placed
# before first Match block directive
elif [ "$FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" -lt "$FIRST_MATCH_BLOCK" ]
then
# Replace first uncommented case-insensitive occurrence
# of PermitRootLogin directive
sed -i "$FIRST_PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN s/^[[:space:]]*PermitRootLogin.*$/PermitRootLogin no/I" $SSHD_CONFIG
# Case: PermitRootLogin directive present in $SSHD_CONFIG and placed
# after first Match block directive
else
# Prepend 'PermitRootLogin no' before first uncommented
# case-insensitive occurrence of Match block directive
sed -i "$FIRST_MATCH_BLOCK s/^\([[:space:]]*Match[^\n]*\)/PermitRootLogin no\n\1/I" $SSHD_CONFIG
fi
fi
|
Disable SSH Access via Empty PasswordsruleTo explicitly disallow SSH login from accounts with
empty passwords, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config :
PermitEmptyPasswords no
Any accounts with empty passwords should be disabled immediately, and PAM configuration
should prevent users from being able to assign themselves empty passwords.
Rationale:
Configuring this setting for the SSH daemon provides additional assurance that
remote login via SSH will require a password, even in the event of
misconfiguration elsewhere.
Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^PermitEmptyPasswords' 'no' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Do Not Allow SSH Environment OptionsruleTo ensure users are not able to override environment
options to the SSH daemon, add or correct the following line
in /etc/ssh/sshd_config :
PermitUserEnvironment no
Rationale:
SSH environment options potentially allow users to bypass
access restriction in some configurations.
Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^PermitUserEnvironment' 'no' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Use Only Approved CiphersruleLimit the ciphers to those algorithms which are FIPS-approved.
Counter (CTR) mode is also preferred over cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode.
The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
demonstrates use of FIPS-approved ciphers:
Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
The man page sshd_config(5) contains a list of supported ciphers.
Rationale:
Unapproved mechanisms that are used for authentication to the cryptographic module are not verified and therefore
cannot be relied upon to provide confidentiality or integrity, and system data may be compromised.
Operating systems utilizing encryption are required to use FIPS-compliant mechanisms for authenticating to
cryptographic modules.
FIPS 140-2 is the current standard for validating that mechanisms used to access cryptographic modules
utilize authentication that meets industry and government requirements. For government systems, this allows
Security Levels 1, 2, 3, or 4 for use on Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
identifiers:
references:
AC-3, AC-17(2), AU-10(5), CM-6(b), IA-5(1)(c), IA-7, 68, 366, 803, SRG-OS-000033-GPOS-00014, SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061, SRG-OS-000125-GPOS-00065, SRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093, SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173, RHEL-07-040110, 6.2.11, Test attestation on 20121024 by DS Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^Ciphers' 'aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Use Only FIPS Approved MACsruleLimit the MACs to those hash algorithms which are FIPS-approved.
The following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
demonstrates use of FIPS-approved MACs:
MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256
The man page sshd_config(5) contains a list of supported MACs.
Rationale:
DoD Information Systems are required to use FIPS-approved cryptographic hash
functions. The only SSHv2 hash algorithms meeting this requirement is SHA2.
Remediation script:
function replace_or_append {
local config_file=$1
local key=$2
local value=$3
local cce=$4
local format=$5
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "3" ]
then
echo "Usage: replace_or_append 'config_file_location' 'key_to_search' 'new_value'"
echo
echo "If symlinks need to be taken into account, add yes/no to the last argument"
echo "to allow to 'follow_symlinks'."
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# Test if the config_file is a symbolic link. If so, use --follow-symlinks with sed.
# Otherwise, regular sed command will do.
if test -L $config_file; then
sed_command="sed -i --follow-symlinks"
else
sed_command="sed -i"
fi
# Test that the cce arg is not empty or does not equal CCENUM.
# If CCENUM exists, it means that there is no CCE assigned.
if ! [ "x$cce" = x ] && [ "$cce" != 'CCENUM' ]; then
cce="CCE-${cce}"
else
cce="CCE"
fi
# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed "s/[\^=\$,;+]*//g" <<< $key)
# If there is no print format specified in the last arg, use the default format.
if ! [ "x$format" = x ] ; then
printf -v formatted_output "$format" $stripped_key $value
else
formatted_output="$stripped_key = $value"
fi
# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
if `grep -qi $key $config_file` ; then
$sed_command "s/$key.*/$formatted_output/g" $config_file
else
echo -ne "\n# Per $cce: Set $formatted_output in $config_file" >> $config_file
echo -ne "\n$formatted_output" >> $config_file
fi
}
replace_or_append '/etc/ssh/sshd_config' '^MACs' 'hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha1' 'CCENUM' '%s %s'
|
Verify Permissions on SSH Server Public *.pub Key Filesrule
To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/*.pub , run the command:
$ sudo chmod 0644 /etc/ssh/*.pub
Rationale:
If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service
may be compromised.
|
Verify Permissions on SSH Server Private *_key Key Filesrule
To properly set the permissions of /etc/ssh/*_key , run the command:
$ sudo chmod 0600 /etc/ssh/*_key
Rationale:
If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be
impersonated.
|
Network Time ProtocolgroupThe Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system
clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so
time will drift unpredictably on unmanaged systems. Central time
protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among
a network of machines, and that their time is consistent with the
outside world.
If every system on a network reliably reports the same time, then it is much
easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of
cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain
types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these
protocols may be unreliable or even unusable.
Depending on the specifics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as
important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your
network is connected to the Internet, using a public timeserver (or one
provided by your enterprise) provides globally accurate timestamps which may be
essential in investigating or responding to an attack which originated outside
of your network.
A typical network setup involves a small number of internal systems operating
as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those
internal servers.
There is a choice between the daemons ntpd and chronyd , which
are available from the repositories in the ntp and chrony
packages respectively.
The default chronyd daemon can work well when external time references
are only intermittently accesible, can perform well even when the network is
congested for longer periods of time, can usually synchronize the clock faster
and with better time accuracy, and quickly adapts to sudden changes in the rate
of the clock, for example, due to changes in the temperature of the crystal
oscillator. Chronyd should be considered for all systems which are
frequently suspended or otherwise intermittently disconnected and reconnected
to a network. Mobile and virtual systems for example.
The ntpd NTP daemon fully supports NTP protocol version 4 (RFC 5905),
including broadcast, multicast, manycast clients and servers, and the orphan
mode. It also supports extra authentication schemes based on public-key
cryptography (RFC 5906). The NTP daemon (ntpd ) should be considered
for systems which are normally kept permanently on. Systems which are required
to use broadcast or multicast IP, or to perform authentication of packets with
the Autokey protocol, should consider using ntpd .
Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html for more detailed comparison of features of chronyd
and ntpd daemon features respectively, and for further guidance how to
choose between the two NTP daemons.
The upstream manual pages at http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/manual.html for
chronyd and http://www.ntp.org for ntpd provide additional
information on the capabilities and configuration of each of the NTP daemons.
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contains 3 rules |
Enable the NTP Daemonrule
The chronyd service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable chronyd.service
Note: The chronyd daemon is enabled by default.
The ntpd service can be enabled with the following command:
$ sudo systemctl enable ntpd.service
Note: The ntpd daemon is not enabled by default. Though as mentioned
in the previous sections in certain environments the ntpd daemon might
be preferred to be used rather than the chronyd one. Refer to:
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html
for guidance which NTP daemon to choose depending on the environment used.
Rationale:Enabling some of chronyd or ntpd services ensures
that the NTP daemon will be running and that the system will synchronize its
time to any servers specified. This is important whether the system is
configured to be a client (and synchronize only its own clock) or it is also
acting as an NTP server to other systems. Synchronizing time is essential for
authentication services such as Kerberos, but it is also important for
maintaining accurate logs and auditing possible security breaches.
The chronyd and ntpd NTP daemons offer all of the
functionality of ntpdate , which is now deprecated. Additional
information on this is available at
http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Dev/DeprecatingNtpdate Remediation script:
if ! `rpm -q --quiet chrony` && ! `rpm -q --quiet ntp-`; then
function package_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local package_operation=$1
local package=$2
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -ne "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: package_command 'install/uninstall' 'rpm_package_name"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If dnf is installed, use dnf; otherwise, use yum
if [ -f "/usr/bin/dnf" ] ; then
install_util="/usr/bin/dnf"
else
install_util="/usr/bin/yum"
fi
if [ "$package_operation" != 'remove' ] ; then
# If the rpm is not installed, install the rpm
if ! /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
else
# If the rpm is installed, uninstall the rpm
if /bin/rpm -q --quiet $package; then
$install_util -y $package_operation $package
fi
fi
}
package_command install chrony
service_command enable chronyd
elif `rpm -q --quiet chrony`; then
if ! [ `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd` ] ; then
function service_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
echo
echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
echo "as the last argument"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
service_util="/sbin/service"
chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi
# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
service_state="enable"
service_operation="start"
chkconfig_state="on"
else
service_state="disable"
service_operation="stop"
chkconfig_state="off"
fi
# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
$service_util $service $service_operation
$chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
$service_util $service_operation $service
$service_util $service_state $service
fi
# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \
if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
else
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
fi
fi
}
service_command enable chronyd
fi
else
function service_command {
# Load function arguments into local variables
local service_state=$1
local service=$2
local xinetd=$(echo $3 | cut -d'=' -f2)
# Check sanity of the input
if [ $# -lt "2" ]
then
echo "Usage: service_command 'enable/disable' 'service_name.service'"
echo
echo "To enable or disable xinetd services add \'xinetd=service_name\'"
echo "as the last argument"
echo "Aborting."
exit 1
fi
# If systemctl is installed, use systemctl command; otherwise, use the service/chkconfig commands
if [ -f "/usr/bin/systemctl" ] ; then
service_util="/usr/bin/systemctl"
else
service_util="/sbin/service"
chkconfig_util="/sbin/chkconfig"
fi
# If disable is not specified in arg1, set variables to enable services.
# Otherwise, variables are to be set to disable services.
if [ "$service_state" != 'disable' ] ; then
service_state="enable"
service_operation="start"
chkconfig_state="on"
else
service_state="disable"
service_operation="stop"
chkconfig_state="off"
fi
# If chkconfig_util is not empty, use chkconfig/service commands.
if ! [ "x$chkconfig_util" = x ] ; then
$service_util $service $service_operation
$chkconfig_util --level 0123456 $service $chkconfig_state
else
$service_util $service_operation $service
$service_util $service_state $service
fi
# Test if local variable xinetd is empty using non-bashism.
# If empty, then xinetd is not being used.
if ! [ "x$xinetd" = x ] ; then
grep -qi disable /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd && \
if ! [ "$service_operation" != 'disable' ] ; then
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = no/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
else
sed -i "s/disable.*/disable = yes/gI" /etc/xinetd.d/$xinetd
fi
fi
}
service_command enable ntpd
fi
|
Specify a Remote NTP ServerruleDepending on specific functional requirements of a concrete
production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Server system can be
configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the
default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html
for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for
further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.
To specify a remote NTP server for time synchronization, perform the following:
- if the system is configured to use the
chronyd as the NTP daemon (the
default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows, - if the system is configured to use the
ntpd as the NTP daemon,
edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below.
Add or correct the following lines, substituting the IP or hostname of a remote
NTP server for ntpserver:
server ntpserver
This instructs the NTP software to contact that remote server to obtain time
data.
Rationale:Synchronizing with an NTP server makes it possible to collate system
logs from multiple sources or correlate computer events with real time events.
Remediation script:
var_multiple_time_servers="0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org"
if ! `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd`; then
if ! `grep -q ^server /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/chrony.conf
done
else
sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/chrony.conf
fi
fi
else
if ! `grep -q ^server /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/ntp.conf
done
else
sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/ntp.conf
fi
fi
fi
|
Specify Additional Remote NTP ServersruleDepending on specific functional requirements of a concrete
production environment, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Server system can be
configured to utilize the services of the chronyd NTP daemon (the
default), or services of the ntpd NTP daemon. Refer to
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/7/html/System_Administrators_Guide/ch-Configuring_NTP_Using_the_chrony_Suite.html
for more detailed comparison of the features of both of the choices, and for
further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.
Additional NTP servers can be specified for time synchronization. To do so,
perform the following:
- if the system is configured to use the
chronyd as the NTP daemon
(the default), edit the file /etc/chrony.conf as follows, - if the system is configured to use the
ntpd as the NTP daemon,
edit the file /etc/ntp.conf as documented below.
Add additional lines of the following form, substituting the IP address or
hostname of a remote NTP server for ntpserver:
server ntpserver
Rationale:Specifying additional NTP servers increases the availability of
accurate time data, in the event that one of the specified servers becomes
unavailable. This is typical for a system acting as an NTP server for
other systems.
Remediation script:
var_multiple_time_servers="0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org"
if ! `/usr/sbin/pidof ntpd`; then
if [ `grep -c '^server' /etc/chrony.conf` -lt 2 ]; then
if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/chrony.conf` ; then
for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/chrony.conf
done
else
sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/chrony.conf
fi
fi
else
if [ `grep -c '^server' /etc/ntp.conf` -lt 2 ]; then
if ! `grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' /etc/ntp.conf` ; then
for i in `echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n'` ; do
echo -ne "\nserver $i iburst" >> /etc/ntp.conf
done
else
sed -i 's/#[ ]*server/server/g' /etc/ntp.conf
fi
fi
fi
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